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ABSTRACT 
 
 Historical conceptualizations of psychopathic personality emphasized affective 
deficits as characteristic of the disorder. Contemporary research reports deficits in facial 
emotion recognition, with particularly strong effects for recognition of fearful faces.  
Researchers have proposed a number of theories to explain the interaction between 
psychopathic traits and emotion processing deficits. The response modulation hypothesis 
emphasizes deficits in shifting attention from goal-directed behavior, whereas the 
Integrated Emotions System model emphasizes deficits in moral socialization due to 
abnormalities in fear processing. The current research investigated whether individuals 
elevated in psychopathic traits displayed deficits in recognizing emotion overall, deficits 
specific to fear recognition, and/or deficits in attention to fearful faces. A sample of 110 
undergraduate students completed the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure, a facial emotion 
recognition task, and a visual dot probe task. Participants relatively elevated in 
psychopathic traits also completed an attentional retraining task to determine if their 
attention could be directed to fearful faces. Finally, an ASL Eye-Trac 6 eye-tracker was 
used to investigate whether gaze fixations on the eyes or the mouth of an emotional face 
were associated with deficits in emotion processing.  Accuracy of emotion identification 
was recorded for each participant. Additionally, a facilitation index was calculated for 
the dot probe task to measure attentional orientating to emotional stimuli.  
Contrary to hypotheses, individuals elevated in psychopathic traits did not 
display overall deficits in identification of emotional faces overall or for fear faces 
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specifically. Results indicated that individuals elevated in psychopathic traits displayed 
deficits in identifying disgusted faces. As hypothesized, reduced response time to fearful 
faces in the dot probe task was associated with elevations in psychopathic traits. 
However, the attentional retraining task did not increase attention to fearful faces. 
Finally, deficits in emotion recognition and emotional attention were not associated with 
eye gaze. The results suggest that psychopathy may not be universally associated with 
emotion recognition performance. Instead, deficient emotion processing in psychopathic 
individuals may be due to attentional deficits rather than inability to identify emotional 
facial expressions. Interpretations of these results are limited by small sample size and 
the use of an undergraduate student sample.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Psychopathy is a personality disorder consisting of a combination of behavioral 
and personality traits, such as deceitfulness, charm, insufficiently motivated antisocial 
behavior, and dysfunctional emotional responding (Cleckley, 1941).  It has long been a 
challenging subject in both psychiatric and forensic settings (Cleckley, 1941; Hare, 
1993). Offenders diagnosed as psychopathic commit a disproportionate amount of 
violent crime, are a difficult population to treat, and researchers continue to debate the 
scope, measurement, and definition of the disorder (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009).  
Scores from the most widely researched psychopathy assessment instrument, the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991/2003), have been reliably 
associated with adverse outcomes for society, with high-scoring individuals committing 
particularly violent and instrumental forms of aggression and crime (Hare, 1998; Reidy, 
Kearns, & DeGue, 2013; Reidy, Shelley-Tremblay, & Lilienfeld, 2011). PCL-R-defined 
psychopathic individuals can be difficult to manage in institutional settings, creating a 
pressing problem even when such individuals are incarcerated (Guy, Edens, Anthony, & 
Douglas, 2005). Although exact statistics are difficult to quantify, PCL-R-defined 
psychopaths are alleged to commit between 30-50% of all violent crimes (Hare, 1999; 
Reidy et al., 2011) with an estimated cost to society of at least $250 billion annually 
(Anderson, 1999; Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011). Recent research has also examined the 
possible impact of so-called “successful” psychopaths in the workplace, or psychopathic 
individuals committing white-collar crime (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010; Ragatz & 
Fremouw, 2012; S. F. Smith & Lilienfeld, 2013).  
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Due to its high societal and monetary costs, psychopathy remains an urgent target 
for research. Yet, despite decades of research, debate continues as to the relevance of 
different behavioral, personality, and interpersonal traits to psychopathic personality. 
Central to this debate is whether criminal behavior is central to the construct or simply 
correlated with psychopathy (Skeem & Cooke, 2010a).  Tendencies to engage in 
antisocial behavior, and particularly criminal behavior, are considered by many to be 
central to the construct due to strong associations between criminal behavior and 
psychopathy when operationalized by the PCL-R (Hare, 1991/2003). As a result, some 
discredit other measures and theories of the disorder when these newer models fail to 
strongly correlate with criminal behavior (Skeem & Cooke, 2010b).  
Despite such claims, psychopathy is arguably associated with criminal behavior 
because many of the items comprising the PCL-R (e.g., criminal versatility, juvenile 
delinquency, failure on conditional release) are in fact quantifications of overt criminal 
behaviors (rather than personality traits), resulting in criterion contamination and 
reification of non-specific ‘bad conduct’ as a core part of the syndrome (Skeem & 
Cooke, 2010a). Skeem and Cooke (2010a) warn against the reification of the PCL-R and 
equating the measure with the construct itself. Although many conceptualizations of 
psychopathy emphasize antisocial behavior, other theories emphasize to a greater degree 
personality traits associated with the disorder. In particular, emotional detachment or 
dysfunction is considered central to psychopathy by many classic (Cleckley, 1976; 
Lykken, 1957) and modern (Lilienfeld et al., 2012; Patrick et al., 2009) 
conceptualizations of the construct.  
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Emotional dysfunction in particular may result in antisocial behavior in a variety 
of ways (Herpertz & Sass, 2000).  Moral behavior is theorized to require being able to 
experience feelings evoked by reward and punishment (Dolan, 1999). Emotional 
detachment prevents experiencing the affective states of others, which in normal 
individuals is assumed to inhibit antisocial behavior (Dolan, 1999; Herpertz & Sass, 
2000; Raine, 1993). Additionally, poor conditioning may lead to failure to consider the 
consequences of one’s actions.  Deficient emotional learning, such as poor conditioning, 
is associated with poor development of the conscience (Raine, 1993).   
The purpose of this research is to clarify the relevance of emotional dysfunction, 
specifically deficient fear recognition, to psychopathic personality. The paper begins 
with a discussion of historical and current conceptualizations of the disorder, as well as 
theories concerning the development of psychopathy. Next, the paper examines research 
findings regarding attentional and emotional dysfunction in psychopathic individuals, 
including the relevance of fear to the construct. Finally, the review concludes with an 
examination of the Triarchic conceptualization of psychopathy (Patrick et al., 2009) and 
methods proposed by this model for examining the relationship between fearlessness and 
psychopathy. 
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1.1 PSYCHOPATHY  
Psychopathic individuals typically are defined by a combination of interpersonal, 
affective, and behavioral traits. Behaviorally, psychopathic individuals may be 
impulsive, sensation seeking, and have low frustration tolerance, which may result in 
antisocial behavior such as violence and crime.  Interpersonally, psychopathic 
individuals are callous, selfish, superficial, charming, and manipulative. In the affective 
domain, psychopathic individuals display fearlessness, emotional detachment, and lack 
of empathy and remorse.   
The modern construct of psychopathy is most often operationalized by the traits 
measured by the PCL-R (Hare, 2003). The PCL-R contains items that tap interpersonal, 
affective, impulsive, and antisocial behavior features of psychopathy. Factor analyses of 
the PCL-R historically identified two factors (Hare et al., 1990; Harpur, Hakstian, & 
Hare, 1988; Harpur, Hare, & Hakstian, 1989). Factor 1 encompasses the interpersonal 
and affective traits of psychopathy whereas Factor 2 encompasses antisocial deviance.  
A more recent factor model divides the measure into four factors (Hare & Neumann, 
2006). Factor 1 consists of the two facets of affective (callousness, shallow affect) and 
interpersonal (charm, deceitfulness, manipulation) traits, whereas Factor 2 consists of an 
“impulsive-irresponsible” factor in addition to the antisocial factor that includes items 
tapping aggressiveness, juvenile delinquency, and criminal versatility. Factor 1 
correlates positively with social dominance, narcissism, and exploitativeness and 
negatively with depression, fearfulness, and anxiety. Factor 2 correlates positively with 
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aggression, impulsivity, sensation seeking, frequency and severity of criminal offending, 
and drug and alcohol abuse.   
Due to the popularity of the PCL-R, most studies define groups as non-
psychopaths or psychopaths based on a score on the PCL-R of below 20 or above 30, 
respectively; studies that present a middle or “mixed” psychopathy group include 
individuals scoring between 20 and 30.  Additionally, due to the necessity of file 
information to score the PCL-R and the number of items measuring antisocial and 
criminal behavior, most studies use offender populations.  Unless otherwise stated, 
studies cited in this review compared psychopathic offenders with controls using the 
Psychopathy Checklist (Hare, 1980) and its derivatives. 
Psychopathy is a personality disorder with evidence of developmentally similar 
traits in child and adolescent age ranges, such as callous-unemotionality observed in 
children and adolescents (Frick, Ray, Thornton, & Kahn, 2013; Frick, Stickle, 
Dandreaux, Farrell, & Kimonis, 2005).  Though many conceptualizations of 
psychopathy place an emphasis on antisocial behavior (Hare, 2006; McCord & McCord, 
1964), several models consider emotional deficits to play a central causal role in the 
development of the disorder (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005; Lykken, 1995; Patrick, 
1994; Patrick et al., 2009).  
Cleckley’s (1941) seminal work “The Mask of Sanity” presented one of the first 
and most influential modern descriptions of psychopathic personality. Cleckley 
described psychopathic individuals as superficially appearing to be well-adjusted and 
normal members of society, with serious interpersonal difficulties but otherwise lacking 
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in distress or apparent mental illness. He described the inability of psychopathic 
individuals to experience emotions as a form of “semantic aphasia.” Other historical 
conceptualizations of the disorder also emphasized the relationship between lack of 
affect – specifically negative affect – and the development of psychopathy. For example, 
Karpman differentiated between primary and secondary psychopathy; primary 
psychopaths are low in anxiety and thought to develop the disorder due to deficient 
negative affect, whereas secondary psychopaths experience negative affect and are 
thought to acquire psychopathy due to environmental factors such as poor upbringing 
(Karpman, 1941).  Hare (1968) proposed that a lack of negative emotion in response to 
punishment leads to the development of psychopathic behavior, as these individuals lack 
motivation to avoid risks.  
Similarly, some developmental perspectives propose that an inability to 
experience negative emotions in response to others’ distress may lead to the 
development of psychopathic personality. Specifically, Blair (1995)  proposes the 
Violence Inhibition Mechanism (VIM), a cognitive model of moral development and 
socialization . The VIM was described as an early developing system that generates 
emotionally aversive reactions when activated by distress cues (Blair, 2005).  As a 
result, individuals learn to avoid causing distress in others to prevent an aversive 
response; even the thought of causing pain is aversive. The VIM hypothesis proposes 
that this deficient moral socialization impairs the ability of psychopathic individuals to 
experience empathy.  Another proposed mechanism in the development of psychopathy 
is the response modulation (RM) hypothesis (Newman, 1998; Patterson & Newman, 
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1993). The RM hypothesis is an attention-based model that proposes that impulsivity, 
poor avoidance learning, and emotion processing deficits emerge from an inability to 
shift attention from goal-directed behavior to peripheral information (Lorenz & 
Newman, 2002). Both of these hypotheses concerning the development of psychopathy 
are partially supported by research investigating the relationship between attention, 
emotion, and psychopathy. 
1.2 ATTENTION, EMOTION, AND PSYCHOPATHY  
Attention and Emotion 
Attention is the process by which stimuli are selected for processing (Blair & 
Mitchell, 2009).  Stimulus selection is influenced by both top-down and bottom-up 
processing. Multiple stimuli are processed in a mutually inhibitory manner, in which a 
gain in activity in neurons representing one stimulus occurs at the cost of activity for 
another (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). This theory of attention is known as the biased 
competition model (Duncan, 1998).  Bottom-up and top-down processes influence which 
stimuli “win” this competition for attention. Bottom-up processes are biased towards 
visually salient objects, such as objects that are moving or bright. In contrast, top-down 
processes occur as a function of task demands, such as searching for an object of a 
particular color.  Bias as a result of task demands may result in stimuli that are not 
visually salient “winning” the competition for attention (Blair & Mitchell, 2009).  
Emotional attention is a form of processing bias in which emotional 
representations in the temporal cortex are enhanced by input from the amygdala (Pessoa 
& Ungerleider, 2004). Emotional stimuli are aversive or appetitive unconditioned and 
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conditioned stimuli. Conditioning involves the interaction between the temporal cortex 
and the amygdala, such that stimuli that are associated with valence information activate 
the amygdala (LeDoux, 1998).  Reciprocal activation between the temporal cortex and 
amygdala means that when emotional stimuli are a distracter to stimuli relevant to task 
performance, interference from this stimulus will be greater than if the stimuli were 
neutral, an assertion that is supported by the emotional attention research literature (K. S. 
Blair et al., 2007; Erthal et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001).  In 
contrast, emotional stimuli will enhance performance when the stimulus is relevant to 
task demands, as demonstrated by research with emotional lexical decision paradigms 
(Lorenz & Newman, 2002). Some researchers have proposed that amygdala activation 
from emotions such as fear is automatic (Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003). However, several 
studies show that amygdala activation due to fear and other emotions can be altered by 
attentional manipulations (Mitchell et al., 2007; Pessoa, 2005; Pessoa, McKenna, 
Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002). 
Decreased emotional responsiveness has been consistently observed in 
psychopathic populations (Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 1993), including decreased 
responsiveness to punishment (Schmauk, 1970; Siegel, 1978). The most common 
finding in the literature is that psychopathic individuals show deficient avoidance 
learning (Blair, 2005; R.J.R. Blair et al., 2004; Flor, Birbaumer, Hermann, Ziegler, & 
Patrick, 2002; Newman & Schmitt, 1998). Changing behavior in response to aversive 
consequences is challenging for psychopathic individuals, particularly when in scenarios 
where a reward is being lost (Newman, Widom, & Nathan, 1985). Psychopathy is 
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associated with lowered autonomic response to aversive stimuli in both psychopathic 
offenders (Hare, 1968; Hare & Quinn, 1971; Lorber, 2004; Patrick, Cuthbert, & Lang, 
1994) and adolescents (Fung et al., 2005) classified using the Child Psychopathy Scale 
(CPS; Lynam, 1997).  Additionally, psychopathic personality is inversely related to self-
reported reactions of shame and guilt (Mullins-Nelson, Salekin, & Leistico, 2006). The 
inability to learn from aversive conditioning or experience punishment is generally 
known as the fear dysfunction model (Blair, 2005). These observed deficits in emotional 
responsiveness might be a result of dysfunctional emotional attention; however, it is 
unclear whether the deficits are due to overall dysfunctions in shifting attention or 
specific to emotional attention.  
Research testing the RM hypothesis supplies some evidence that psychopathy is 
associated with deficient emotional attention.  For example, psychopathic individuals 
show less interference in Stroop tasks (Hiatt, Schmitt, & Newman, 2004; Newman, 
Schmitt, & Voss, 1997) and are less quick to respond to emotional high-frequency words 
than neutral low-frequency words in lexical decision tasks (Lorenz & Newman, 2002). 
In non-psychopathic individuals, emotional words are more easily recognizable as words 
and therefore individuals respond more quickly. However, the assertion of the RM 
hypothesis that psychopathic individuals have inherent difficulty in shifting attention to 
nondominant cues is contradicted by some research findings (Blair & Mitchell, 2009).  
Psychopathic offenders (LaPierre, Braun, & Hodgins, 1995; Mitchell, Colledge, 
Leonard, & Blair, 2002) and adolescents classified using the Antisocial Process 
Screening Device (APSD; Frick & Hare, 2001) are unimpaired in shifting attention in set 
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shifting tasks, such as the Wisconsin Card-Sorting Task (R.J.R. Blair, Colledge, & 
Mitchell, 2001).  Additionally, executive attention is not dysfunctional and may even be 
enhanced in psychopathic offenders (Hiatt et al., 2004; Newman et al., 1997) and 
students classified with the Psychopathy Personality Inventory-Revised (PPI-R; 
Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) subscales (Dvorak-Bertsch, Curtin, Rubenstein, & 
Newman, 2009).  Research demonstrating deficient passive avoidance learning in 
psychopathic individuals supports deficient stimulus-reinforcement learning, such as the 
reciprocal relationship between the temporal cortex and the amygdala during 
conditioning implicated in emotional attention, rather than overall deficient attentional 
mechanisms (Blair & Mitchell, 2009).    
If psychopathy is the result of deficient emotional attention then psychopathic 
individuals should display less interference from emotional stimuli.  Indeed, although 
normal individuals show interference on motor tasks from positive or negative rather 
than neutral stimuli, psychopathic individuals show no significant interference due to 
these emotional distracters (Mitchell, Richell, Leonard, & Blair, 2006). Additionally, 
psychopathic individuals do not display reduced recall for peripheral information when 
presented with emotional images (Christianson et al., 1996). Other research supports the 
VIM hypothesis that psychopathic individuals do not experience distress in response to 
others’ pain.  For example, psychopathic offenders (Aniskiewicz, 1979; House & Lloyd 
Milligan, 1976) and children measured by the APSD (Blair, 1999) have shown reduced 
autonomic responses to displays of distress in others and do not show the expected 
augmented startle response when primed with victimization scenes (Levenston, Patrick, 
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Bradley, & Lang, 2000).  More recent research suggests that top-down attention 
modulates amygdala activation in psychopathy (Larson et al., 2013).  Decreased 
amygdala activity was found in psychopathic offenders only when their attention had 
been previously engaged in an alternative goal-relevant task prior to the threat-relevant 
information; when focus was on the threat, amygdala activation did not differ between 
psychopaths and non-psychopaths (Larson et al., 2013). Overall, the research evidence 
supports the hypothesis that deficient emotional attention, and therefore possible 
dysfunction in the amygdala, is associated with impaired emotional responsiveness in 
psychopathic individuals.  
Psychopathy and Fear 
 As noted above, early clinical conceptualizations of psychopathy referenced a 
negative relationship between psychopathy and fear. Karpman (1941) noted that primary 
psychopaths did not experience negative affect, and Cleckley (1976) wrote, “he appears 
almost as incapable of anxiety as of profound remorse” (Cleckley, 1976, pg. 340). 
Lykken proposed that fearlessness is the core trait out of which the full condition of 
psychopathy arises (Lykken, 1957). Even McCord and McCord, who viewed 
psychopathy as more centrally related to antisocial behavior, commented that 
psychopathic individuals experience little anxiety or worry (McCord & McCord, 1964). 
These clinical descriptions are supported by research evidence implicating amygdala 
dysfunction and malfunctioning fear systems in psychopathy. 
The amygdala is involved in learning and aversive conditioning, as well as 
responses to fearful and sad faces (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999; LeDoux, 
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1998). Blair (2003) proposed that impaired socialization processes, namely aversive 
conditioning and instrumental learning, are associated with the pathology of 
psychopathy, and that these impaired processes result from damaged fear systems in the 
brain, particularly amygdala dysfunction. Fear systems in the brain are involved in 
aversive conditioning, autonomic responses to threat, startle reflex from visual threat 
primes, and passive avoidance learning, all areas of demonstrated deficits in 
psychopathic individuals (Flor et al., 2002; Hare, 1982; Levenston et al., 2000; Lykken, 
1957; Mitchell et al., 2002; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman, Patterson, & Kosson, 
1987; Ogloff & Wong, 1990). Additionally, neuroimaging studies provide evidence for 
amygdala dysfunction in psychopathy (Ermer, Cope, Nyalakanti, Calhoun, & Kiehl, 
2012; Kiehl, 2006; Kiehl et al., 2001; Motzkin, Newman, Kiehl, & Koenigs, 2011; 
Tiihonen et al., 2000). Psychopathic individuals display a reduced amygdala response 
when processing words of negative valence in PCL-R high scoring versus low scoring 
individuals and present with reduced amygdala activation during emotional memory and 
aversive conditioning tasks (Kiehl et al., 2001; Veit et al., 2002). 
 As stated in the VIM hypothesis, distress recognition deficits are another 
proposed theory for the relevance of fearlessness to psychopathy (Blair et al., 2002).  
Psychopathy is associated with poorer facial affect recognition, including failure to react 
in the presence of a fearful face (Iria & Barbosa, 2009). Several studies report that 
children and adults who are high in psychopathic traits are impaired in naming sad and, 
particularly, fearful facial expressions and vocal tones (Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 
2001; R.J.R. Blair et al., 2002; Hastings, Tangney, & Stuewig, 2008; Stevens, Charman, 
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& Blair, 2001). Children with psychopathic traits as measured by the APSD and the 
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (Goodman, 1999) are also impaired in 
recognizing fearful facial expressions, a deficit associated with their lack of attention to 
the eyes of the stimulus (Dadds, Masry, Wimalaweera, & Guastella, 2008; Dadds et al., 
2006). A meta-analysis of affect recognition in antisocial populations reported that these 
individuals display a consistent deficit in recognizing expressions of fear and sadness 
with the strongest effects for lack of recognition of fear; furthermore, this deficit in 
identifying fear could not be explained by task difficulty (Marsh & Blair, 2008).  
However, some studies have failed to find a significant difference in facial 
emotion recognition. For example, PCL-R Factor 1 elevated inmates did not differ from 
non-psychopathic offenders in facial emotion recognition (Glass & Newman, 2006). 
More research evidence is needed to determine whether psychopathic individuals 
consistently differ from non-psychopathic populations in their recognition of fearful 
affect. Furthermore, it is of yet unclear whether these research findings result from 
performance deficits or an underlying inability, though some results suggest that there is 
not a lack of capacity to identify fearful affect (Dadds et al., 2006).  Evidence of 
improved affect recognition in psychopathic individuals would suggest that they do not 
lack the capacity altogether.   
 A neuroscience model, the Integrated Emotions System (IES) model, is an 
integration of the VIM and fear dysfunction positions (Blair, 2005). The position of the 
IES is not that the amygdala itself is dysfunctional in psychopathic individuals; rather, 
that some functional tasks (such as aversive conditioning) that require the amygdala are 
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impaired in these individuals. As stated by the author, the IES “predicts that individuals 
with psychopathy should present with impairment on any task reliant on the amygdala’s 
role in the formation of stimulus–reinforcement associations” (Blair, 2005, pg. 877). The 
amygdala deficits impair psychopathic individual’s ability to form stimulus-punishment 
associations, which interferes with moral socialization. As a result, individuals may not 
learn to associate antisocial behavior with aversive responses and may be more likely to 
engage in antisocial behavior to achieve their goals. This theory is consistent with 
models of psychopathy that stress the importance of the amygdala and emotion in the 
formation of psychopathy (Kiehl, 2006; Lykken, 1995; Patrick, 1994). Similarly, recent 
examinations of the response modulation hypothesis suggest that deficient attention 
shifting may produce or affect the observed amygdala deficits, resulting in lack of 
attention to affective cues and deficient aversive learning (Larson et al., 2013; Newman 
& Baskin-Sommers, 2011).  Evidence for this hypothesis includes that psychopathic 
individuals show a normal fear-potentiated startle response when explicitly attending to 
threat cues, and that the diminished fear-potentiated startle responses in psychopaths 
compared to non-psychopaths is observed when attention was already engaged by 
another task (Baskin-Sommers, Curtin, & Newman, 2011; Newman, Curtin, Bertsch, & 
Baskin-Sommers, 2010). Therefore, training psychopathic individuals to attend to non-
relevant affective cues could in theory result in observable changes in their behavior.  
 In addition to neuroscientific evidence supporting the relevance of fear to 
psychopathy, trait fear is also consistently associated with psychopathy in assessment 
measures. PCL-R Factor 1 is negatively associated with anxiety, and research using the 
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PCL-R has identified an emotionally stable subtype of psychopathic offenders with low 
trait anxiety and high positive emotionality (Harpur et al., 1989; Hicks, Markon, Patrick, 
Krueger, & Newman, 2004).  
The Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) was 
created to measure psychopathic traits in community samples, in contrast to the offender 
samples of the PCL-R.  Factor analyses of the PPI reveal two factors, fearless dominance 
(PPI-FD) and self-centered impulsivity (PPI-SCI; Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen, & 
Krueger, 2003).  PPI-SCI is composed of subscales measuring impulsive nonconformity, 
blame externalization, egocentricity, and carefree nonplanfulness. Fearless dominance is 
composed of the subscales social potency, stress immunity, and fearlessness.  PPI-FD is 
related to reduced processing of fearful facial expressions and diminished physiological 
reactivity to threat (Lilienfeld et al., 2012).   High scores on PPI-FD are associated with 
positive psychological and social adjustment as well as with narcissism, thrill seeking, 
and low empathy. In contrast, PPI-SCI generally reflects the relationships of PCL-R 
Factor 2, with positive associations with impulsivity, aggressiveness, antisocial behavior, 
drug and alcohol problems, and negative affect (Benning et al., 2003; Benning, Patrick, 
Salekin, & Leistico, 2005; Blonigen et al., 2005; Patrick, Edens, Poythress, & Lilienfeld, 
2006). Fearlessness is correlated positively with positive emotionality and negatively 
with negative emotionality, and is positively associated with adaptive factors such as 
stress immunity (Marcus, Fulton, & Edens, 2013).   
Researchers continue to debate the relevance of PPI-FD, and in turn, 
fearlessness, to the psychopathy construct (Lilienfeld et al., 2012; Marcus et al., 2013; J. 
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D. Miller & Lynam, 2012). Some consider PPI-FD to represent the “mask of sanity” 
described by Cleckley, because it reflects a quasi-adaptive collection of traits that, in 
isolation, appear to have little relationship with dysfunction. Others view the adaptive 
qualities of fearlessness to be separate from the construct of psychopathy because of the 
small convergent correlations exhibited by PPI-FD and other psychopathy measures, as 
well as whether the external correlates of PPI-FD fit conceptually with the psychopathy 
construct as measured by other methods (Miller & Lynam, 2012). Comparisons of the 
factors of the PPI and the PCL-R show only modest correspondence, with PPI-FD only 
modestly correlated with the interpersonal component of the PCL-R (Benning, Patrick, 
Blonigen, Hicks, & Iacono, 2005). Additionally, while PPI-SCI shows correlations with 
aggressive behavior, PPI-FD does not correlate with aggression (J. D. Miller & Lynam, 
2012). A meta-analysis of the nomological network of the PPI-R claimed to find good 
support for the validity of the PPI total and SCI scores, but weak support for PPI-FD; 
additionally, PPI-FD is uncorrelated with PPI-SCI and only minimally correlated with 
the PCL-R factors (J. D. Miller & Lynam, 2012).  
Despite these claims, a considerable body of research supports the relevance of 
PPI-FD to the construct of psychopathy, and the external correlations of PPI-FD are 
consistent with Cleckley’s classic description of psychopathy (Lilienfeld et al., 2012). 
More recently, it has been proposed that fearlessness may lead to the development of 
psychopathy in combination with other personality characteristics, such as impulsivity 
and coldheartedness; while fearlessness may be an adaptive trait on its own, it is the 
combination of fearlessness with other, more maladaptive, traits that result in a 
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prototypically psychopathic personality pattern (Lilienfeld et al., 2012; Marcus et al., 
2013). Supporting this proposition, one study found that forensic inpatients with high 
levels of both PPI-SCI and PPI-FD were at the highest risk for predatory aggression (S. 
T. Smith, Edens, & McDermott, 2013). Another recent assessment model, the Triarchic 
model, seeks to conceptualize how the combination of different traits contributes to the 
presentation of psychopathic personality (Patrick et al., 2009).  
1.3 THE TRIARCHIC MODEL  
 The Triarchic model is not a new theory of psychopathy; rather, it is a descriptive 
framework for integrating findings across alternative conceptualizations and clarifying 
the nature of constructs embodied in differing measures of psychopathy (Patrick, 
Drislane, & Strickland, 2012). The model includes descriptions of three phenotypic 
components of psychopathy: disinhibition, meanness, and boldness.  Disinhibition 
represents the general proneness to impulse control problems that is often observed in 
psychopathic individuals and is associated with negative affect and deficient behavioral 
restraint. Disinhibition and proneness to externalizing behavior have been emphasized to 
varying degrees in historical conceptualizations of psychopathy; in particular, the 
construct of secondary psychopathy (Karpman, 1941; Lykken, 1995) is consistent with 
externalizing behavior.  Additionally, variance in PCL-R Factor 2 that is separate from 
variance in Factor 1 reflects externalizing proneness (Patrick, Hicks, Krueger, & Lang, 
2005).  Boldness is a concept that encompasses confidence, tolerance for risk, and quick 
recovery from stressful or threatening situations. Boldness is minimally represented in 
PCL-R Factor 1, particularly in items reflecting charm and grandiosity (Patrick, Hicks, 
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Nichol, & Krueger, 2007). Finally, meanness encompasses traits such as deficient 
empathy, lack of close attachments, and tendency to engage in exploitative behavior. 
Meanness is well represented by affective and interpersonal items in the PCL-R (Patrick 
et al., 2012). Additionally, modeling research on externalizing psychopathology 
demonstrates that meanness can be separated from general disinhibition (Krueger, 
Markon, Patrick, Benning, & Kramer, 2007; Venables & Patrick, 2012). Most other 
models identify only one (e.g., DSM) or two (e.g., Hare, 1991/2003) of these 
components in their descriptions of psychopathy—usually disinhibition and meanness. 
The Triarchic framework combines the behavioral and interpersonal-affective traits most 
commonly identified in the PCL-R with personality factors such as those measured in 
the PPI (i.e., boldness is similar to PPI-FD).  
 The Triarchic model does not propose that these components are underlying 
indicators of an overall psychopathy construct; instead, combinations of these 
components may create different “pictures” of psychopathy such as the differing 
descriptions of psychopathic individuals in the literature (low anxiety vs. high anxiety, 
criminal vs. psychiatric, successful vs. non-successful; Patrick et al., 2012).  For 
example, disinhibition is closely related to externalizing behavior, yet externalizing 
behavior is not a trait unique to psychopathic personality – other clinical disorders such 
as ADHD and substance abuse are also characterized by externalizing behavior.  It is the 
combination of disinhibition with traits associated with boldness and meanness that 
creates the clinical picture of psychopathy. Patrick (2012) recently described a dual-
process model that integrates various attentional and emotional theories of psychopathy, 
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in which impairments in attentional processing and emotional responding contribute 
differently to the affective and antisocial behavioral components of the disorder.   
Dispositional fearlessness, which reflects underlying deficits in the fear 
processing systems of the brain such as the defensive motivational system, may 
contribute to both boldness and meanness. It is important to note, however, that the 
global construct of psychopathy is not a disorder on the opposite pole of anxiety. Some 
factors of psychopathy actually demonstrate a positive relationship with anxiety; for 
example, PPI-SCI demonstrates a small positive correlation with anxiety (.25) (J. D. 
Miller & Lynam, 2012). Secondary psychopathy is characterized by high rather than low 
levels of anxiety, which partly differentiates it from primary psychopathy (Lykken, 
1995). Fearlessness gives rise to the clinical presence of psychopathy in the presence of 
other, maladaptive traits such as disinhibition and meanness; as the Triarchic model 
proposes that these components combine to create the clinical picture of psychopathy, it 
is to be expected that different combinations of levels of traits would result in different 
“types” of psychopaths who show divergent correlations with external criterion variables 
such as anxiety (Patrick et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the Triarchic model proposes that these components are phenotypic 
expressions of underlying genotypes.  For example, fearlessness as identified by 
behavioral and neurological studies may be a genotypic component of psychopathy, but 
may then be expressed as phenotypic boldness or meanness.  Both components are 
associated with fearlessness (Patrick et al., 2009). Theoretical models and research 
evidence suggest that risk taking and tolerance for threatening situations are 
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characteristic of boldness, whereas work with children with CU traits suggests that weak 
fear responses contribute to phenotypic meanness (Frick & Marsee, 2006; Frick & 
Morris, 2004). For example, children’s fearlessness to a loud noise at age 2 is 
significantly related to persistence of conduct problems between the ages of 2 and 8 
(Shaw, Gilliom, Ingoldsby, & Nagia, 2003) and antisocial children with CU traits are 
less distressed by the negative effects of their behavior on others (Blair, Jones, Clark, & 
Smith, 1997; Frick, Lilienfeld, Ellis, Loney, & Silverthorn, 1999; Pardini, Lochman, & 
Frick, 2003). Patrick et al. (2009) proposed that phenotypic pathways to boldness and 
meanness emerge as a result of parenting and socialization during development. Based 
on research investigating internalized conscience in toddlers (Kochanska, 1995; 
Kochanska, 1997), Patrick et al. hypothesized that security of attachment leads to 
development of conscience.  However, conflict with a difficult to control child could 
interfere with the development of a mutually positive relationship, contributing to 
meanness rather than boldness. Boldness evolves naturally from low fear, with low 
stress reactivity resulting directly from low defense-system sensitivity. In contrast, 
meanness could represent the outcome of low fear temperament in failed socialization 
processes.  
 Understanding underlying genotypic components contributing to psychopathic 
personality disorder eventually may contribute to the development of interventions 
tailored to unique clinical pictures of psychopathy (Patrick et al., 2012).  Patrick et al. 
(2012) suggests the potential utility of attentional retraining procedures, which are 
focused on modifying existing attentional biases through presentation of reward cues. 
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Attentional retraining using the dot-probe task has proven successful for individuals with 
anxiety disorders as measured by lower scores on anxiety measures, reduction in threat-
related attention bias, and a greater effect on state rather than trait anxiety (Hakamata et 
al., 2010).  Attentional retraining reduces symptoms measured by both self-report and 
interviewer-rated measures and results in a significantly larger proportion of individuals 
who no longer meet criteria for generalized anxiety disorder than individuals completing 
a control task (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009).  Symptom reduction is 
maintained in anxious individuals at a four-month follow-up (Amir, Beard, Taylor, et al., 
2009).   Dot probe tasks present two stimuli (usually pictures or text) simultaneously on 
a screen for a short time interval. This presentation is followed immediately by one or 
two dots in the location of one of the stimuli.  The dots appear in the location of both 
types of stimuli equally (50% of the time at each stimulus).  Attentional bias is indicated 
through quicker reaction times to dots that appear in the location of a particular type of 
stimulus. Anxious individuals are biased towards threatening or anxiety-inducing 
pictures or words, compared to neutral cues. Attentional retraining modifies the existing 
dot probe task by presenting the reward cue (dots) at the location of one type of stimulus 
90% of the time.   
Though a simple procedure, attentional retraining has been shown to have 
positive effects, such as symptom reduction outside of the context of treatment, across a 
variety of anxiety disorders (Hakamata et al., 2010).  As anxiety is associated with a 
lower rather than a higher threshold for activation of the brain’s defensive motivational 
system due to overgeneralized anticipatory responding to threat (Craske & Waters, 2005; 
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Luu, Tucker, & Derryberry, 1998; Stein, Goldin, Sareen, Zorrilla, & Brown, 2002), it 
can be considered the converse of some aspects of psychopathic personality, particularly 
fearlessness and boldness (Patrick, Drislane, & Strickland, 2012).  Therefore, using 
attentional retraining to establish rather than eliminate biases towards aversive stimuli 
could be beneficial for reducing psychopathy.  
The dot probe task has recently been used to examine attention to aversive 
stimuli in youth with traits of primary and secondary psychopathy (Kimonis, Frick, 
Cauffman, Goldweber, & Skeem, 2012).  Participants were classified as psychopathic or 
non-psychopathic using their scores on the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory (YPI; 
Andershed, Kerr, Stattin, & Levander, 2002), a self-report measure aimed at capturing 
the interpersonal and affective personality features of psychopathy.  A cluster analysis 
identified primary and secondary subtypes of psychopathy in the sample using scores on 
the subscales of the YPI and the Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; 
Reynolds & Richmond, 1985; 2000). The secondary subgroup reported significantly 
higher anxiety, worry, social and concentration concerns, and impulsivity than the 
primary subgroup. The results did not demonstrate any significant differences in 
attention to aversive stimuli between psychopathic individuals and a comparison group 
of individuals scoring lower than 12.5 on the YPI. However, the high anxious and low 
anxious subtypes did differ in responding to distressing stimuli, which supports the 
presence of different subtypes of psychopathy. The primary subgroup was not 
attentionally engaged by presentation of distressing stimuli while the secondary 
subgroup was more attentive to distressing emotional stimuli.  Additionally, as traits 
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associated with meanness have been associated with deficient empathy and recognition 
of fearful affect (see callous unemotional traits and impaired fearful affect recognition; 
Dadds et al. 2006, 2008), Patrick proposed that the presentation of fearful versus neutral 
faces, instead of aversive versus neutral pictures, could be relevant for individuals 
elevated in meanness (Patrick et al., 2012).  Regardless of the usefulness of attentional 
retraining as an intervention, the research literature suggests that psychopathic 
individuals can be expected to display emotional attention deficits to aversive stimuli or 
fearful faces in the dot probe task.  
Though researchers continue to debate the centrality of fearlessness to the 
construct of psychopathy, evidence consistently demonstrates a negative relationship 
between psychopathy and fear. It remains unclear whether deficient fear responding in 
psychopathic individuals is due to a deficit in general attention to emotions, shifting 
attention, or emotion recognition failures.  This study aims to contribute to the growing 
research literature on fearlessness and psychopathy. Specifically, this research 
investigates whether individuals scoring high in psychopathy, particularly in boldness 
and meanness, display general facial emotion recognition deficits or deficits for 
particular emotions. Furthermore, this study will measure whether deficits in facial 
emotion recognition are associated with eye gaze to features of the displayed face, such 
as the lack of attention to the eyes observed in children with psychopathic traits (Dadds 
et al., 2006). Finally, to further investigate deficient attention as a possible source of 
fearlessness contributing to boldness and meanness, a dot-probe task will be used to 
measure whether individuals scoring high in psychopathy show significantly lower 
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attention to fearful compared to neutral facial expressions when their attention is 
directed towards alternative cues. Hypotheses include: 
1. Individuals elevated in TriPM measured psychopathy will differ significantly in 
their identification of and attention to fearful faces from individuals scoring 
lower on these traits, 
2. High versus low psychopathy scoring individuals will show significantly less 
attention to fearful compared to neutral faces in a dot-probe task when their 
attention is directed towards other cues, and 
3. Attentional retraining using the dot-probe task will result in increased attention to 
fearful faces in individuals scoring high in psychopathy 
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2. METHOD 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
 Participants were undergraduate students at a large southwestern U.S. university 
recruited through the Psychology Department subject pool. Participants were 
compensated with research credit or extra credit in their undergraduate psychology 
courses.  Students had the option of an alternative assignment instead of participation in 
a research study. Participants were asked to bring corrective eyewear if needed, resulting 
in normal or corrected vision for all participants. Power computations using G*Power 
suggested a conservative sample of approximately 100 participants, based on the effect 
sizes reported in the Dadds et al. (2006) and Kimonis et al. (2012) studies.  
A total of 113 individuals participated in the study. Of these 113 participants, 
three participants’ data were not able to be collected due to computer errors, resulting in 
a final sample of 110 participants. Of these 110 participants, 74 identified as women and 
36 identified as men. The majority of participants reported their racial/ethnic status as 
Caucasian (70%; Hispanic or Latino = 18.2%, Black or African American = 3.6%, Asian 
or Pacific Islander = 5.5%, Other = 1.8%; 1 participant not reporting) and were between 
18 and 19 years old (46.4% and 33.6%, respectively; 20 = 10.9%, 21 = 6.4%, 22 = 
2.7%). All participants were unmarried and did not have children. Independent samples 
t-tests revealed significant differences between men and women in terms of boldness, 
t(108) = 2.45, p = .016, d = 0.50, meanness, t(108) = -4.44, p < .001, d = 0.91, 
disinhibition, t(108) = 3.07, p = .003, d = 0.63, and total TriPM scores, t(108) = 4.40, p < 
.001, d = 0.90. Examinations of means determined that men scored higher than women 
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on all TriPM subscales. There were more women in the low psychopathy group (n = 49) 
than the low psychopathy group (n = 25). However, there were far more men in the high 
psychopathy group (n = 30) than the low psychopathy group (n = 6). These findings are 
consistent with a large body of literature on gender differences in psychopathy that 
generally reports higher psychopathy scores in men than in women on a number of 
measures (for reviews, see Cale & Lilienfeld, 2001; Forouzan & Cooke, 2005; Verona & 
Vitale, 2006).  
2.2 APPARATUS AND MATERIALS 
Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM) 
 The TriPM is a 58-item self-report measure of the Triarchic conceptualization of 
psychopathy. It is composed of 3 scales intended to measure boldness (19 items), 
meanness (19 items), and disinhibition (20 items). Using a 4-point scale, participants rate 
the degree to which the items apply to them (mostly false, false, mostly true, true).  
Rather than a total score, the measure yields three domain scores.  Internal consistency 
reliability estimates have ranged from .77 to .90 in correctional samples, and between 
.82 and .88 in college student samples (Sellbom & Phillips, 2012).   
ASL Eye-Trac 6 
 Visual interest was measured using an infrared eye-tracker with remote optics 
(Model D6, Applied Science Laboratories).  The remote optics system uses corneal and 
retinal reflections of infrared light to measure gaze position with an accuracy of 
approximately 0.5 degrees of visual angle, a margin of error consistent with the natural 
function of the human eye.   The video head tracking camera, situated below the 
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computer monitor, uses face recognition software to compensate for head movement. 
Consequently, participants sit freely in front of the computer.  ASL software was used 
for stimulus presentation/data collection (Paradigm Elements, ASL) and data analyses 
(ASL Results Plus). ASL Eye-Trac 6 recorded fixations, defined as a period of at least 
100 milliseconds during which the point of regard did not change more than 1-degree 
visual angle (i.e., less than ½ in on the display). Regions (“areas of interest”) were 
defined in ASL Results, which allowed determination of whether fixations were on the 
eye region or the mouth region of each stimulus.  Additionally, the software recorded the 
duration in milliseconds of each fixation. Total fixations and total duration were 
calculated for each emotion in both tasks. Before conducting analyses of the eye tracking 
results, the accuracy of eye tracking was assessed by calculating the percent of eye data 
tracked (e.g., the percent of eye movements that were recorded by the eye tracking 
device) for each participant.  To account for outliers resulting from program errors, 
participants with percentage of eye data tracked two or more standard deviations below 
the mean were excluded from analyses. 
NimStim Face Stimulus Set 
 The NimStim is a set of 646 facial expression stimuli developed for the study of 
face and emotion recognition. The set consists of 70 models of different gender and 
racial backgrounds displaying the following emotions: fearful, happy, sad, angry, 
surprised, calm, neutral, and disgusted (Tottenham et al., 2009). The set was validated 
using 81 untrained volunteers who are similar to individuals who typically participate in 
face processing studies. Images are naturally posed with separate open- and closed-
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mouth versions for each emotion.  In order to compute an average emotion identification 
accuracy score, 10 pictures of each emotion (with calm and neutral expressions 
combined, resulting in a total of 70 images) were randomly selected from the 646 total 
pictures for inclusion in the emotion identification task.  
Dot Probe Task 
 The dot probe task was adapted from Miller and Fillmore (2010) and presented 
using Paradigm software. After presentation of a fixation cross in the center of the screen 
(500 milliseconds), participants were presented with two pictures from the NimStim 
from fearful and neutral categories. The position of the pictures was randomly presented 
at the left or the right of the fixation cross. After 1000 milliseconds, the two pictures 
disappeared and the probe stimulus (either “<” or “>”) appeared in the location of one of 
the pictures. Participants were asked to press one key (“<”) if the probe was to the left of 
the fixation cross and another key (“>”) if the probe was to the right of the fixation cross. 
The probe was presented for a maximum of 1000 milliseconds. The dot probe task 
consisted of one block of 12 practice trials and three blocks of 40 trials.  For participants 
who were in the top 10% of meannesss and disinhibition, in the first block the probe was 
presented equally behind the fearful and neutral faces. In the second block, the 
attentional retraining task, the probe was presented paired with the fearful face 90% of 
the time. Finally, in the last block the participants completed the first block again, with 
the probe presented 50% of the time at each category of stimuli.  For participants who 
were in the bottom 10% of meanness and disinhibition, the first block with the probe 
presented equally behind the fearful and neutral faces was completed three times. These 
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participants did not complete the attentional retraining task in order to act as a 
comparison group for the participants high in meanness and disinhibition.  All trials 
were sampled randomly without replacement.  
Participant scores on the dot probe task were determined by calculating the mean 
number of correct keyboard responses (left arrow or right arrow) to the location of the 
probe for each of the three experimental blocks. A correct response was coded as “1” 
and an incorrect response was coded “0”, resulting in a score range of 0 to 1 when 
computing an average of all responses. A nonresponse was recorded as an incorrect 
response; however, nonresponses were not included in calculations of average response 
time (latencies). The time between when the probe appears and when the participant 
presses a key corresponding to its location is recorded in milliseconds and used for 
calculation of a facilitation index (see Kimonis et al., 2012).  The facilitation index is 
calculated by subtracting the average response time in milliseconds (latency) to probes 
in the location of fear faces from the average response time to probes in the location of 
calm faces (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988): facilitation = 1/2 [(calm, probe left – fear, 
probe left) + (calm, probe right – fear, probe right)]. This formula controls for potential 
location effects (participant’s tendency to attend to the left or the right of the screen) by 
summing latencies for left and right picture locations and taking their average. The 
assumption of dot probe tasks is that if the spatial location of the probe (in this case, left 
or right of the fixation cross) corresponds to the location where a participant’s attention 
is allocated, then their response time will be faster than if their attention were allocated 
elsewhere. Therefore, higher scores indicate greater attentional orientating to emotional 
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stimuli (in this case, fearful faces; see Kimonis, Frick, Fazekas, & Loney, 2006; 
Kimonis, Frick, Muñoz, & Aucoin, 2008; Kimonis et al., 2012). 
Facilitation indices were calculated for 87 of the 89 dot probe participants due to 
insufficient data (e.g., participants responded to less than 90% of the 40 slides, or less 
than 50% of probes for calm or fear faces; these participants’ dot probe responses fell 
more than 3 standard deviations above or below the mean).   
2.3 PROCEDURE 
To recruit participants, we adapted a recruitment strategy from Guarraci et al. 
(2013), which demonstrated that the TriPM Meanness and Disinhibition scales can 
provide an experimental sample consistent with characterizations of “primary” 
psychopathy (i.e., high in self-reported externalizing tendencies and low in internalizing 
problems). Potential participants completed the TriPM electronically on Qualtrics, an 
online survey platform. These participants participated in a prescreening assessment for 
the undergraduate subject pool. Participants provided informed consent prior to enrolling 
in the prescreening process. The TriPM was completed as part of a larger battery of 
questionnaires used to prescreen participants for a number of psychological studies at the 
university. The order of questionnaires was randomly generated for each participant. 
Participants were not required to answer any of the questions in a section before 
proceeding to the next questionnaire. Across three semesters, a total of 3,402 participants 
completed the TriPM as part of the prescreening assessment (32% women, 68% men; 3 
not reporting gender). Participants’ scores on the TriPM during the prescreening process 
were used solely for recruitment purposes and were not used in subsequent analyses. 
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Individuals scoring in the top and bottom 10% of both Meanness and Disinhibition (high 
meanness/high disinhibition and low meanness/low disinhibition) were contacted for 
participation in the experimental tasks. These individuals had no further obligation to 
participate in the study.  
A total of 110 participants completed the experimental tasks. After completing 
informed consent, participants were presented with a demographic survey and the TriPM 
on a desktop computer, both administered using the Qualtrics survey platform. 
Following the completion of these surveys, participants completed the emotion 
identification task. To obtain valid and reliable eye-movement data, 9 gaze positions 
covering over 80% of the viewing area were be collected for each participant (i.e., a 9-
point calibration). After calibration, participants were presented with the randomized 70 
facial emotion recognition stimuli. Participants were instructed to click the word 
corresponding to the emotion displayed by the face on their screen (choice options of 
fearful, happy, sad, angry, surprised, neutral, and disgusted). Correct identification rate 
for each emotion was determined by calculating the average score for all 10 faces 
displayed for each emotion (an incorrectly identified emotion was scored as “0” and a 
correctly identified emotion was scored as “1”); resulting in a scale of 0 to 1. Following 
the emotion recognition task, participants completed the dot probe task. At the 
completion of the experiment, participants were debriefed and compensated with 
research participation credit.  
Due to hardware issues with the experiment computers that resulted in 
discontinuation of data collection between Qualtrics survey completion and the 
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experimental tasks, data for a total of 96 of the 110 participants was available for the 
emotion identification task.  For the dot probe task, additional errors in responses 
recorded by the Paradigm software (e.g., the software did not record keyboard responses 
by the participants in the data output file in these cases) resulted in missing data for 7 
additional participants, resulting in a sample size of 89 participants. Finally, hardware 
and program errors in the Eye-Trac 6 system as well as a number of computer crashes 
resulted in missing or lost eye tracking data. As a result, eye tracking data was available 
for only 54 of the 110 participants.  All statistical analyses were conducted a second time 
to determine if there were significant differences between the participants with eye 
tracking data available and participants without eye tracking data available on all 
outcome variables. Comparisons of the two groups of participants (those with and 
without eye tracking data) revealed no significant differences. Furthermore, the number 
of men (19 in “no eye tracking” group, 17 in “eye tracking” group) and women (38 in 
“no eye tracking”, 36 in “eye tracking”) was similar whether eye tracking data was 
available or not available. Finally, there were comparable numbers of participants in the 
high psychopathy (28 in “no eye tracking”, 27 in “eye tracking”) and low psychopathy 
(29 in “no eye tracking”, 26 in “eye tracking”) groups. Therefore, results were reported 
collapsed across participants with and without eye tracking data available.  
2.4 ANALYTIC PLAN 
To examine whether individuals high in “primary psychopathy” made 
significantly more errors on an emotion identification task than individuals scoring low 
on these traits, one-way ANOVAs comparing accuracy of emotion recognition (and 
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response time to that emotion) by psychopathy group were conducted. For eye-tracker 
data, I conducted multiple hierarchical regressions (one analysis for each of the six 
emotions) with TriPM scores and interactions entered in steps one and two and eye 
tracking data (fixations on eyes and mouth) entered in step three, with correct emotion 
identification as the dependent variable.  
For the dot-probe task, I conducted ANOVAs comparing errors and reaction time 
latencies for the high and low psychopathy groups. To determine the effectiveness of the 
attentional retraining task at altering the attention of the group high in meanness and 
disinhibition, mean latencies from the first trial block and final trial block of the dot-
probe task were compared using repeated-measures ANOVA.  
 Finally, to investigate the relationship between scores on boldness and meanness 
and fear deficits, linear regressions were conducted with TriPM subscale score (boldness 
and meanness) as independent variables, and accuracy of fear identification and fear 
response latency as dependent variables. A number of exploratory analyses were also 
conducted to address hypotheses about general emotion processing deficits in 
individuals scoring higher in psychopathy.  
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3. RESULTS 
3.1 PSYCHOPATHY SCORES 
Data were collected from 55 participants who were in the bottom 10% of 
meanness and disinhibition in the prescreening sample (“low psychopathy” group) and 
55 participants who were in the top 10% of meanness and disinhibition (“high 
psychopathy” group). Summary statistics for TriPM total and subscale scores can be 
found in Table 1. An independent samples t-test was conducted to determine if the 
recruitment strategy was successful, resulting in higher and lower TriPM score groups. 
There was a significant difference between the groups, t(108) = 8.56, p < .001, d = 1.65. 
The high TriPM group scored significantly higher than the low TriPM group in 
boldness, t(108) = 2.31, p = .023, d = 0.44, meanness, t(85.30) = 9.07, p < .001, d = 1.75, 
and disinhibition, t(108) = 7.69, p < .001, d = 1.48, indicating that the recruitment 
strategy was successful and allowing for group comparisons on dependent variables. 
Mean TriPM scores for the total sample and for each experimental task are presented in 
Table 1.  
3.2 EMOTION IDENTIFICATION TASK 
 A total of 96 participants’ data were available for data analysis due to previously 
mentioned computer hardware errors. Overall, participants were most accurate at 
identifying happy faces (M = .94, SD = .11) and least accurate at identifying fearful faces 
(M = .50, SD = .21). In contrast with predictions, there were no significant correlations 
between boldness, meanness, disinhibition, or total TriPM scores and correct 
identification of fearful, happy, sad, calm, or angry faces (Table 2). Correct 
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identification of disgusted faces was moderately correlated with both meanness (r = -.21, 
p = .041) and disinhibition (r = -.21, p = .041) but was not correlated with boldness or 
total TriPM scores.  
Mean emotion identification scores for the high and low psychopathy groups are 
presented in Table 3.  Prior to comparing means between the groups, exploratory 
independent-samples t-tests were conducted to determine if there were significant 
differences in emotion identification scores between men and women. There were no 
significant differences between men and women on correct emotion identification scores 
for any of the emotion faces. As such, it was determined that gender was not necessary 
to include as a covariate in the following analyses. Additionally, to investigate whether 
there were gender differences in overall emotion identification accuracy, a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) with gender as a fixed factor and accurate 
identification of each emotion as outcome variables was conducted. There was no 
significant effect of gender on emotion identification accuracy, F(7, 88) = 1.90, p = .078.  
To examine our first hypothesis that individuals relatively higher in psychopathic 
traits would demonstrate overall deficits in accurate emotion identification, MANOVA 
was conducted with accurate identification of each emotion as outcome variables and 
psychopathy group (high or low) as a fixed factor. In contrast with the hypothesized 
results, there was no significant effect of psychopathy group on emotion identification 
accuracy, F(7, 88) = 1.34, p = .24.  
In a series of exploratory analyses intended to determine whether individuals 
elevated in psychopathy displayed deficits in facial emotion recognition for specific 
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emotions, differences in correct emotion identification were analyzed with single-factor 
between-subjects ANOVAs, with group (high or low psychopathy) as a fixed factor and 
correct emotion identification as the outcome variable (Table 4). For calm face 
identification, a significant effect of group was not found, F(1, 95) = 1.12, p = .29. Our 
second primary hypothesis was that participants relatively elevated in psychopathic traits 
would show emotion recognition deficits specific to fearful faces. However, for fear face 
identification there was no significant effect of group, F(1, 95) = 0.06, p = .81. There 
were also no significant group effects for anger faces, F(1, 95) = 0.00, p = .96, sad faces, 
F(1, 95) = 1.14, p = .29, disgust faces, F(1, 95) = 2.03, p = .16, or happy faces, F(1, 95) 
= 1.78, p = .19.  
Independent samples t-tests examining differences in mean response times to 
emotion faces between men and women were also conducted. The mean response time 
to calm faces was significantly greater for men (M = 1698.41, SD = 705.26) than for 
women (M = 1402.29, SD = 497.73), t(49.93) = 2.13, p = .039, d = 0.52. Mean response 
times to fear faces were significantly greater for men (M = 1794.12, SD = 629.27) than 
women (M = 1473.99, SD = 601.72), t(94) = 2.42, p = .017, d = 0.53. The difference in 
mean response times to anger faces for men (M = 1727.29, SD = 692.88) and women (M 
= 1439.04, SD = 794.95) was not significant, t(94) = 1.75, p = .084, d = 0.38. Mean 
response times to sad faces were significantly greater for men (M = 1857.15, SD = 
778.96) than women (M = 1362.01, SD = 664.78), t(94) = 3.25, p = .002, d = 0.71. The 
difference in mean response times to disgust faces for men (M = 1462.63, SD = 688.92) 
and women (M = 1144.69, SD = 518.92) was significant, t(94) = 2.53, p = .013, d = 0.55. 
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Finally, mean response times to happy faces were significantly greater for men (M = 
1246.38, SD = 455.87) than women (M = 1014.58, SD =46.02), t(94) = 2.31, p = .023, d 
= 0.51.  Given these differences, gender was treated as a covariate in the next set of 
analyses, excluding analyses for anger faces. Additionally, to investigate whether there 
were gender differences in overall emotion identification response time, a MANOVA 
with gender as a fixed factor and response time to each emotion as outcome variables 
was conducted. There was no significant effect of gender on emotion identification 
response time, F(7, 88) = 1.78, p = .10.  
For an exploratory analysis investigating whether individuals relatively higher in 
psychopathic traits would demonstrate overall deficits in response times to emotion 
faces, a MANOVA was conducted with response time to each emotion as outcome 
variables and psychopathy group (high or low) as a fixed factor. Similar to the previous 
results that reported no difference in emotion identification accuracy, there was no 
significant effect of psychopathy group on emotion identification response times, F(7, 
88) = 0.73, p = .65.  
A series of exploratory analyses examined whether individuals scoring higher in 
psychopathy performed significantly slower on identifying specific emotions than 
individuals scoring low on these traits. A series of one-way ANOVAs and analyses of 
covariance (ANCOVAs) were conducted. Differences in anger face response time 
between psychopathy groups were analyzed with a single-factor between-subjects 
ANOVA. For response time to anger faces, a significant effect of group was not found, 
F(1, 95) = 0.00, p = .99.  Given the significant relationship between gender and mean 
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response times for calm, fear, sad, disgust, and happy faces, psychopathy group mean 
differences were examined with gender as a covariate. Adjusted mean response times are 
presented in Table 5. To examine group differences in calm face response times, a one-
way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted. A test of the assumption of 
homogeneity of slopes revealed no significant interaction between gender and the two 
psychopathy groups, F(1, 95) = 1.07, p = .30.  The overall model was not significant, 
F(2, 95) = 2.82, p = .064, and there was no significant difference among psychopathy 
groups, F(1, 95) = 0.04, p = .84, η2 = .00.  To test the hypothesis that individuals 
elevated in psychopathy would differ significantly in responses to of fearful faces from 
individuals lower in psychopathy, another ANCOVA examining psychopathy group 
differences in fear face response times was conducted. A test of the assumption of 
homogeneity of slopes revealed no significant interaction between gender and the two 
psychopathy groups, F(1, 95) = 0.54, p = .46. The overall model was marginally 
significant, F(2, 95) = 2.91, p = .059. However, in contrast to the hypothesis that there 
would be significant differences in responses to fear faces between psychopathy groups, 
after partialling out the variance associated with gender there was no significant 
difference among the psychopathy groups, F(1, 95) = 0.02, p = .88, η2 = .00.  
Next, group differences in sad face response times were examined. A test of the 
assumption of homogeneity of slopes revealed no significant interaction between gender 
and the two psychopathy groups, F(1, 95) = 0.52, p = .473. The overall model was 
significant, F(2, 95) = 5.23, p = .007. After partialling out the variance associated with 
gender, there was no significant difference among the psychopathy groups, F(1, 95) = 
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0.02, p = .88, η2 = .00.  Another ANCOVA examining psychopathy group differences in 
disgust face response times was conducted. A test of the assumption of homogeneity of 
slopes revealed no significant interaction between gender and the two psychopathy 
groups, F(1, 95) = 1.53, p = .220. The overall model was significant, F(2, 95) = 3.17, p = 
.047.  After partialling out the variance associated with gender, there was no significant 
difference among the psychopathy groups, F(1, 95) = 0.00, p = .96, η2 = .00.  Finally, 
group differences in happy face response times were examined. A test of the assumption 
of homogeneity of slopes revealed no significant interaction between gender and the two 
psychopathy groups, F(1, 95) = 3.82, p = .054.  The overall model was not significant, 
F(2, 95) = 2.77, p = .068, and there was no significant difference among psychopathy 
groups, F(1, 95) = 0.23, p = .64, η2 = .00 (Table 6).  
To test the hypothesis that boldness and meanness would predict fear face 
identification, separate linear regressions with correct fear identification as the 
dependent variable and boldness and meanness as independent variables were 
conducted. In contrast to our predictions neither boldness, F(1,94) = 0.04, p = .84, nor 
meanness, F(1,94) = 0.52, p = .47, were significant predictors of fear face identification.   
As an exploratory analysis, given the recruitment strategy of selecting individuals 
high in meanness and disinhibition to create a sample high in “primary psychopathy” 
and the hypothesized relationship between higher psychopathy scores and fear 
identification, a linear regression with a meanness x disinhibition interaction predicting 
correct fear identification was conducted. The interaction between meanness and 
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disinhibition did not significantly predict correct fear identification, F(1, 94) = 1.78, p = 
.16.  
Eye Tracking Results 
 For the emotion identification task, the average percent eye data tracked was 
83.34% (SD = 18.76%) with a range from 23.38% - 98.87%. To account for outliers, 
participants with percentage of eye data tracked two or more standard deviations below 
the mean were excluded from analyses. This resulted in the exclusion of five 
participants, for a final n of 49 participants.  
The average number of fixations on the eyes and mouth of each emotion are 
reported in Table 7. Across all emotions, the average number of fixations per face was 
3.38 (SD = 1.34) and the average duration of fixations per face was 0.97 seconds (SD = 
0.50).  The average number of fixations on the eyes of each face was 1.08 (SD = 1.09; 
Mduration = 0.32, SD = 0.33) and the average number of fixations on the mouth of each 
face was 1.60 (SD = 1.05; Mduration = 0.46, SD = 0.33). In an exploratory analysis to 
determine if fixations on the eyes or mouth of emotion faces predicted emotion 
identification errors, multiple linear regressions were conducted for each of the six 
emotions, with the total eye and mouth fixations for each emotion as predictors and 
emotion identification errors as the dependent variable. Total fixations on the eyes and 
the mouth did not predict identification errors for calm, happy, sad, anger, or disgust 
faces (Table 8). The model for predicting fear identification errors was significant, 
F(2,46) = 6.14, p = .004. Total fixations on the eyes of fear faces significantly predicted 
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fear identification errors, β = -.46, t(45) = -3.42, p = .001. Total fixations on the mouth 
of fear faces did not predict fear identification errors.  
To examine the hypothesis that deficits in facial emotion recognition for 
individuals higher in psychopathic traits would be associated with eye gaze to features of 
the displayed face, a series of multiple hierarchical regressions were conducted. Prior to 
conducting all hierarchical multiple regressions, the relevant assumptions of this 
statistical analysis were tested and met for all independent and dependent variables in 
these analyses.  The data met the assumptions of collinearity, independent and normally 
distributed errors, homogeneity of variance, linearity, and non-zero variances. 
To determine the contribution of fixations on the eye area and mouth area on the 
prediction of correct emotion identification above and beyond the contribution of TriPM 
scores, a three-step multiple hierarchical regression was conducted for each of the six 
emotions. Boldness, meanness, and disinhibition scores were entered at step one, the 
interaction variables (boldness*meanness, boldness*disinhibition, 
meanness*disinhibition, boldness*meanness*disinhibition) were entered at step two, and 
the eye tracking variables (average fixations on eyes, average fixations on mouth) were 
entered in step three. A summary of the hierarchical regression results can be found in 
Table 9. In contrast with predicted results, TriPM scales and interactions did not 
significantly predict identification rate for calm, fear, sad, anger, or happy faces. 
Fixations on eyes and mouth of emotion faces were also not significant predictors for 
those emotions.  
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For disgust faces, the model was not significant at step one (F (3,45) = 2.41, p = 
.079). Introducing the interaction variables explained 19% of variation in disgust face 
identification rate and this change in R² was significant, F (7,41) = 2.86, p = .016, F 
(ΔR2) = 2.88, p = .034. Although the overall model was significant at step three, (F 
(9,39) = 2.40, p = .028), introducing the eye and mouth fixation variables did not 
significantly account for additional variance in the prediction of disgust identification 
rate, ΔR2 = .03, F (ΔR2) = 0.87, p = .43. The model at step two accounted for 33% of the 
variance in disgust identification rate. The only significant predictor was the 
meanness*disinhibition interaction, (β = .48, t(41) = 2.76, p = .009), which accounted for 
13% of the variation in disgust identification rate (Table 10). However, this finding 
should be interpreted cautiously given the potential for spurious effects due to small 
sample size and large number of analyses.  
3.3 DOT PROBE TASK   
 Mean response time and dot probe scores are presented in Table 11. At least 64% 
of participants gave correct answers to all 40 slides and only two participants provided 
fewer than 70% correct responses
1
. There were no significant correlations between 
boldness, meanness, disinhibition, or total TriPM scores and dot probe task total scores 
or fear face scores (Table 12). However, there was a significant correlation between 
meanness and Block 1 calm scores (r = -.24, p = .023). 
There were also no significant correlations between boldness, meanness, 
disinhibition, or total TriPM scores and total response time for any of the three blocks 
                                                 
1
 98% of participants scored between .90 and 1.00 on the dot probe task. 
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(Table 13). As expected, there was a significant positive correlation between meanness 
and Block 1 response time (r = .24, p = .021) for fear faces, indicating that response time 
to fearful faces increased as meanness scores increased. Additionally, for calm faces 
there were significant correlations between Block 2 response time and meanness (r = 
.28, p = .007) and TriPM total scores (r = .23, p = .027).  To further examine the 
hypothesized relationship between meanness and response time to the probe replacing 
fear faces, linear regressions were conducted with meanness predicting response time in 
Blocks 1, 2, and 3. Meanness significantly predicted Block 1 response times, β = .24, R2 
= .04, t(89) = 2.28, p = .025, but it did not significantly predict response times to fear 
faces in Block 2, F(1,88) = 1.64, p = .20, or Block 3, F(1,88) = 1.74, p = .19. 
Facilitation was not calculated for Block 2, as half of the participants completed 
an attentional retraining block with the probe replacing calm faces only 10% of the time 
to examine whether the retraining task affected performance of individuals in the high 
psychopathy group. Participants in the low psychopathy group did not complete the 
attentional retraining task in order to act as a comparison group for the participants high 
in meanness and disinhibition.  Average facilitation indices in Block 1 (M = 1.86, SD = 
18.21) and Block 3 (M = 2.34, SD = 25.36) suggest that all participants responded more 
quickly to probes replacing fear pictures. Contrary to predictions, there were no 
significant correlations between the facilitation indices and TriPM scores (Table 14). As 
an exploratory analysis, independent samples t-tests examining differences in facilitation 
in Block 1 and Block 3 between genders were conducted.  In Block 1, mean facilitation 
was significantly greater for women (M = 4.63, SD = 19.79) than men (M = -3.70, SD = 
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13.17), t(78.07) = -2.33, p = .022, d = 0.47. There was not a significant difference in 
mean facilitation between men (M = 7.52, SD = 25.36) and women (M = -0.25, SD = 
25.18) in Block 3, t(85) = 1.35, p = .18, d = 0.31.  
To test the hypothesis that boldness and meanness would predict fear response 
latency, separate linear regressions for boldness and meanness were conducted with 
facilitation in Block 1 and in Block 3 as dependent variables. Boldness was not a 
significant predictor of facilitation in Block 1, F(1,85) = 0.04, p = .84, or Block 3, 
F(1,85) = 0.86, p = .38. Meanness was also not a significant predictor of facilitation in 
Block 3, F(1,85) = 0.68, p = .41. However, the model for meanness predicting 
facilitation approached significance in Block 1, F(1,85) = 3.49, p = .065, β = -0.20, R2 = 
.04, consistent with the hypothesis that individuals higher in meanness would respond 
more slowly to fearful faces than individuals lower in meanness. As an exploratory 
analysis, linear regressions with a meanness x disinhibition interaction predicting 
facilitation in Blocks 1 and 3 were conducted. The interaction between meanness and 
disinhibition did not significantly predict facilitation in Block 1, F(1, 83) = 1.17, p = .33, 
or Block 3, F(1, 83) = 0.33, p = .80.   
Mean facilitation scores in Block 1 and Block 3 split by gender and psychopathy 
group are presented in Table 15. Given the differences in facilitation between men and 
women, gender was included as a fixed factor in the following analysis. A two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of gender on change in 
facilitation between Blocks 1 and 3 in the high and low psychopathy conditions (Table 
16). In contrast to the hypothesis that attentional retraining would result in increased 
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attention to fearful faces in Block 3 in individuals scoring high in psychopathy, there not 
a significant change in facilitation across dot probe task blocks, Wilks’ λ = 1.00, F(1,83) 
= 0.23, p = .64. There was no significant interaction between psychopathy group and 
change in facilitation across blocks, F(1, 83) = 1.42, p = .24, or between gender and 
change in facilitation across blocks, F(1, 83) = 0.34, p = .56.  Additionally, there was no 
significant interaction between psychopathy group, gender, and change in facilitation 
across blocks, F(1, 83) = 2.39, p = .13. There were no significant effects of the between-
subjects factors, psychopathy group F(1, 83) = 0.03, p = .87, and gender, F(1, 83) = 
0.17, p = .68.  
Eye Tracking Results 
For the dot probe task, the average percent eye data tracked was 78.84% (SD = 
23.11%) with a range from 10.76%-99.40%. To account for outliers, participants with 
percentage of eye data tracked two or more standard deviations below the mean were 
excluded from analyses. This resulted in the exclusion of five participants, for a final n 
of 47 participants. The average number of fixations and duration of fixations for calm 
and fear faces are reported in Table 17. On average, participants fixated more on fearful 
faces and on the eye area of both fearful and calm faces.  
 Inconsistent with our hypotheses, there were no significant correlations between 
TriPM scores and any of the eye tracking variables in Block 1 (Table 18). In Block 2, 
there was a significant correlation between total fixations on calm faces and meanness (r 
= -.34, p = .022), and between total fixations on calm faces and disinhibition (r = -.34, p 
= .018), indicating that participants higher in meanness and disinhibition had 
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significantly fewer numbers of fixations on calm faces. In Block 3, meanness (r = .38, p 
= .009), disinhibition (r = .33, p = .025), and total TriPM scores (r = .36, p = .013) were 
significantly correlated with fixations on the eye area of calm faces. To determine 
whether fixations on areas of interest predicted facilitation, linear regressions were 
conducted with fixations on the eye and mouth areas of fear and calm faces predicting 
facilitation in Block 1 and Block 3. None of the fixation variables predicted facilitation 
in Block 1, F(6,37) = 0.96, p = .47, or Block 3, F(8,78) = 1.19, p = .33.  
To investigate the possible moderating effects of gender and interactions between 
boldness, meanness, and disinhibition on the relationship between fixations on areas of 
interest and facilitation, two hierarchical linear regressions were conducted with 
facilitation in Block 1 and in Block 3 as dependent variables.  Participant gender was 
entered in step one, boldness, meanness, and disinhibition in step two, TriPM subscale 
interactions in step three, and fixation variables in step four. Inconsistent with 
predictions that individuals higher in psychopathy would demonstrate less attention to 
fear faces than individuals low in psychopathy, the models were not significant for 
predicting facilitation in Block 1 or Block 3 (hierarchical regression results presented in 
Table 19). 
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The current project examined the associations among psychopathic traits, eye 
gaze, and facial emotion processing in a sample of college students.  More specifically, 
this research investigated if individuals higher in psychopathic traits (specifically 
boldness and meanness) demonstrate general emotion identification deficits, or deficits 
for specific emotions such as fear or sadness. Finally, this research examined the extent 
that individuals scoring higher in psychopathic traits showed decreased attention to 
fearful faces when their attention was directed towards alternative cues, and if these 
attention tendencies could be altered by a retraining task.  
The hypothesis that individuals scoring higher on TriPM-measured psychopathy 
would differ significantly in their identification of fearful faces from individuals scoring 
lower in psychopathy was not supported. There were no differences between the high 
and low psychopathy groups on accuracy of fear face identification or in response time 
to fear face identification. Furthermore, specific psychopathic traits such as boldness and 
meanness did not predict accuracy of fear face identification. Some prior research 
(Dawel, O’Kearney, McKone, & Palermo, 2012; Hastings et al., 2008) suggests that 
individuals high in psychopathic traits display overall emotion recognition deficits. For 
example, deficient processing of sad faces has been implicated in the Violence Inhibition 
Mechanism literature (Blair, 1995). Results of this research do not provide support for 
general emotion recognition deficits, as there were no differences between the low and 
high psychopathy groups in identification of, or response time to, any of the emotion 
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faces. In summary, TriPM-measured psychopathy was not significantly associated with 
accurate identification of facial emotions.  
These results are inconsistent with a large body of literature that reports deficits 
in the processing of fear and sadness in psychopathic individuals (Blair et al., 2002; 
Colledge et al., 2001; Hastings et al., 2008; Marsh & Blair, 2008; Stevens et al., 2001). 
However, consistent with the current findings, a number of studies have not found 
deficits in recognizing facial expressions of fear (Book, Quinsey, & Langford, 2007; Del 
Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008; Eisenbarth, Alpers, Segrè, Calogero, & Angrilli, 2008; Glass 
& Newman, 2006; Hansen, Johnsen, Hart, Waage, & Thayer, 2008; Hastings et al., 
2008; Kosson et al., 2002) and/or sadness (Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008; Glass & 
Newman, 2006; Hansen et al., 2008).  One possible reason for inconsistent findings in 
the field is procedural differences between studies. A recent meta-analysis investigated 
the nature of facial affect recognition deficits in psychopathy (Wilson, Juodis, & Porter, 
2011). Specifically, the researchers examined possible procedural moderators to explain 
why some studies find deficits in recognizing fear or other emotions while some studies 
do not find these effects.  Twenty-two studies met the inclusion criteria of the meta-
analysis, which required studies to a) have tested the association between psychopathy 
and facial affect recognition accuracy, b) provide sufficient statistical information, and c) 
use an acceptable operational definition of psychopathy (e.g., not just Antisocial 
Personality Disorder).  The researchers examined whether response style (verbal of 
nonverbal), age of the sample, and sample source (forensic, community) of the studies 
moderated the relationship between psychopathy and facial affect recognition accuracy. 
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For fear, sadness, and anger, larger emotion recognition deficits were found in studies 
with verbal responses given by participants. Other factors such as age and sample source 
did not influence the association between psychopathy and affect recognition deficits.  
The findings in this research and those reported by Wilson et al. (2011) are 
consistent with the left hemisphere activation (LHA) hypothesis (Kosson, 1998), which 
proposes that psychopathy is only associated with information-processing deficits when 
the left hemisphere of the brain is preferentially required for the completion of a task 
(such as language processing).  Accordingly, tasks that require participants to generate a 
verbal description while processing emotion should be associated with worse recognition 
than when responding nonverbally, such as by pressing a button. In the current study 
participants viewed an emotion face and pressed a button on the successive computer 
slide to identify the emotion. Providing emotion names in a multiple-choice format may 
not have sufficiently activated the left hemisphere to see emotion recognition deficits.  
Future studies in this area should investigate emotion deficits in psychopathic 
individuals with tasks that require alternate response styles, such as oral responses or 
fill-in-the-blank, typed responses.  
 Although attention to the eyes of fear faces predicted accuracy of fear 
identification, psychopathy scores were not associated with fixations on particular areas 
of the face. Contrary to our hypotheses, the present study also found no associations 
between eye gaze, psychopathy, and identification of facial emotions. These findings are 
inconsistent with the research of Dadds et al. (2006/2008) that reported associations 
between callous-unemotional traits and attention to the eyes of fearful faces. Possible 
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explanations for differences in these results include that these eye-tracking studies 
examined callous-unemotional traits in children using broader measures of antisocial 
behavior rather than measures of psychopathy. Furthermore, the participants in these 
studies were children rather than adults.  
 Two recent studies have examined eye-tracking indices and psychopathic traits in 
adult samples (Boll & Gamer, 2016; Gillespie, Rotshtein, Wells, Beech, & Mitchell, 
2015). Consistent with the results of the current project, neither study found that 
psychopathic traits significantly predicted emotion identification accuracy. However, 
primary psychopathic traits were associated with reduced number of fixations and 
reduced duration of fixations on the eyes relative to the mouth (Gillespie et al., 2015). 
Additionally, there were significant relationships between primary psychopathic traits 
and attention to the eyes of fearful and angry faces for low intensity emotional 
expressions.  Similar to the present study, Gillespie et al. (2015) used NimStim faces in 
their emotion recognition tasks. However, the researchers used the NimStim photos to 
create expressions of low, moderate, and high intensity based on evidence that 
ambivalent expressions make tasks more sensitive to differences in facial expression 
processing. The use of the original NimStim photos in the current project may explain 
differences in results between this study and Gillespie et al. (2015). Boll and Gamer 
(2016) reported that PPI-R Fearless Dominance and Coldheartedness scores predicted 
reduced face exploration, and participants elevated on Self-Centered Impulsivity had a 
reduced bias to shift attention to the eyes of faces.  In contrast with the present project, 
both of these studies limited their samples to male participants. The studies also differed 
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from the current project in stimulus presentation. In addition to the aforementioned 
differences in emotional intensity in the Gillespie at al. study, Boll and Gamer (2016) 
applied an elliptic mask to photos in order to present faces without hair and ears. Future 
research should examine whether reduced exploration of faces, as well as the 
relationship between facial expression intensity and psychopathic traits, can be 
replicated in samples of both men and women using ecologically valid stimulus sets and 
larger samples.  
 The hypothesis that individuals higher in psychopathic traits would differ in their 
attention to fearful faces was partially supported. In general, participants responded more 
quickly and allocated more attention to fearful faces. There were no associations 
between TriPM scores and overall performance and response times on the dot probe 
task.  However, as expected, meanness was positively associated with response time to 
fearful faces in the first dot probe task block, indicating that increased meanness was 
associated with slower responses to probes replacing fearful faces.  This finding suggests 
that participants higher in meanness were allocating more attention to calm faces than to 
fear faces, resulting in slower responses to probes replacing fearful faces. Further 
supporting this result, the relationship between meanness and facilitation in Block 1 
approached significance, indicating that increased meanness predicted less attentional 
orienting to fearful faces. However, other psychopathic traits (such as boldness) did not 
predict attention to fearful faces.  
 The results of the present research are consistent with prior research that 
demonstrates psychopathic individuals are not deficient in shifting attention in general 
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(Blair et al., 2001; LaPierre et al., 1995; Mitchell et al., 2002).  Furthermore, the current 
results are consistent with the work of Kimonis and colleagues (2012) that reported no 
differences in dot probe task performance between nonpsychopathic and psychopathic 
groups of adolescents. The significant relationship between meanness and Block 1 
facilitation is also consistent with results in the aforementioned study that reported 
differences in performance between “types” of psychopathy. However, although the 
present study did not find a relationship between attention to fear faces and boldness, 
Kimonis and colleagues did report differences between low anxiety and high anxiety 
psychopathy groups’ performance on the dot probe task. Overall, the results of these 
studies suggest that boldness may be related to less attention to threatening or distressing 
images (Kimonis et al., 2012), whereas meanness is related to attention to fearful faces. 
These findings are consistent with Patrick et al.’s (2009) proposal that boldness and 
meanness may share the same genotypic fearlessness but differ in phenotypic 
expression. Similar to the current findings, research with children high in callous 
unemotional traits reports connections between fear responses and meanness, whereas 
tolerance for risk and threat is connected to boldness (Frick & Marsee, 2006; Frick & 
Morris, 2004).  
 The hypothesis that psychopathic traits and eye gaze indices would predict 
attention to fearful faces in the dot probe task was not supported. The finding that 
meanness and disinhibition were associated with fewer fixations on calm faces in Block 
2 of the dot probe task can be explained by the presence of the attentional retraining task. 
Individuals higher in meanness and disinhibition were in the high psychopathy group 
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that completed the retraining task. In the retraining task, probes appeared in the position 
of calm faces only 10% of the time.  As such, participants in the high psychopathy group 
may have quickly learned to allocate attention to the fearful face. Finally, the hypothesis 
that an attentional retraining task would increase attention to fearful faces in individuals 
higher in psychopathic traits was not supported. There were no significant differences in 
facilitation between Block 1 and Block 3 of the dot probe task overall or within the 
psychopathy groups. Participants in the high psychopathy group did not allocate more 
attention to the fearful faces after the retraining task. In fact, in Block 3 of the dot probe 
task, meanness, disinhibition, and total TriPM scores were positively associated with 
fixations on the eye area of calm faces. This result suggests that individuals higher in 
psychopathic traits were allocating significant attention to calm faces even after the 
retraining task.  
  The response modulation hypothesis (Newman et al., 1997) suggests that 
deficiencies in shifting attention from goal-oriented behavior to peripheral information 
are responsible for emotion processing deficits observed in psychopathic individuals. 
Significant findings regarding attention to fearful faces in Block 1 of the dot probe task 
but not Block 3 may be a result of habituation to the task affecting goal orientation of the 
participants. As stated previously, participants may have determined that the goal of the 
task was to allocate attention to fearful faces, attenuating the relationship between 
psychopathic traits and facilitation in Block 3. For example, Larson et al. (2013) 
reported no differences in amygdala activation in response to threat between 
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psychopathic and nonpsychopathic individuals when focus was on threat-relevant 
information.  
 Though hypotheses concerning overall emotion identification deficits were not 
supported, both meanness and disinhibition scores were negatively associated with 
accurate identification of disgusted faces. Furthermore, disgust face identification 
accuracy was significantly negatively predicted by the interaction between meanness and 
disinhibition scores. This finding should be interpreted cautiously given the potential for 
spurious effects due to small sample size and large number of analyses, as well as the 
exploratory nature of this analysis. However, it is worth noting that although this result 
was not hypothesized, deficits in classifying disgust faces have been reported previously 
(Hansen et al., 2008; Kosson, Suchy, Mayer, & Libby, 2002). Similarly, psychopathic 
individuals have been reported to differ in their response to disgust induction and to 
images depicting mutilation that would be expected to induce disgust responses (Forth, 
1992; Levenston et al., 2009). As research on identification of disgust faces in 
psychopathic individuals is limited, future research should examine if disgust processing 
deficits in psychopathic individuals can be replicated.  Additionally, experience of 
disgust has been linked to right-hemisphere brain mechanisms (Phillips et al., 1997), 
which may suggest that a right-hemisphere dysfunction underlies some of the observed 
deficits in emotional processing observed in psychopathic individuals (c.f. Kosson et al, 
2002).  Given that left-hemisphere dysfunction has also been proposed as the origin of 
emotion processing deficits (Kosson, 1998), future research should examine the extent 
that deficits in processing specific emotions are related to dysfunctions in the left or right 
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hemisphere, rather than assuming that all emotion processing deficits in psychopathic 
individuals arise from the same brain mechanism. For example, deficits in processing of 
specific emotions likely originate from different parts of the brain. Evidence suggests 
that fear, anger, and sadness are preferentially processed by the left amygdala (Killgore 
& Yurgelun-Todd, 2001; c.f. Wilson et al., 2011). Rather than functional impairment of 
specific brain areas brain resulting in emotion processing deficits, it is possible that 
activation of multiple areas contribute to dysfunction in an underlying mechanism 
involved in emotion processing (Wilson et al., 2011).  
Another possible explanation for nonsignificant findings in the present study is 
that deficits in facial emotion recognition may vary by gender. One study investigating 
emotion recognition deficits and personality traits reported that psychopathy was related 
to deficits in fear recognition in men but not women (Snowden, Craig, & Gray, 2011). 
The majority of research exploring psychopathy and emotion recognition has used 
correctional or clinical samples (Marsh & Blair, 2008), and many of these samples were 
composed primarily of men. Although the researchers did not perform separate analyses 
for men and women, another study with undergraduates (68% women) reported that PPI 
scores were associated with improved performance on fear recognition tasks (Del Gaizo 
& Falkenbach, 2008). The proportion of men to women in this sample is similar to the 
demographics of the current study. We did not find fear recognition deficits in 
psychopathic men, but there were significant differences between men and women in 
response time to the majority of emotion faces. Additionally, men responded slower than 
women to probes replacing fearful faces in the dot probe task.  The ability to observe 
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interactions between psychopathic traits and gender in this study may have been limited 
by sample size. Analyses in the current project almost certainly lacked sufficient power 
to find significant effects because the number of men in the low psychopathy group (n = 
3, versus 26 men in the high psychopathy group).  
 Although this project contributes to the body of knowledge concerning the 
relationship between psychopathy and emotion processing, conclusions that can be 
drawn from these results are affected by a number of limitations. Statistical analyses 
were likely underpowered due to small sample size (n < 100). Unfortunately, a 
significant portion of the eye tracking results were lost due to equipment failure, further 
decreasing the number of participants included in eye-tracking analyses. Additionally, 
the number of statistical analyses may have increased the likelihood of spurious findings. 
Also, conclusions that can be drawn from the results of this project are limited by the use 
of a college student sample. Finally, the unequal number of men and women in the high 
psychopathy and low psychopathy groups may have limited the ability to detect 
interactions between psychopathy, gender, and emotion processing. Possible gender 
differences in the relationship between emotion processing and psychopathy (Snowden 
et al., 2011) suggest that this study should be replicated in additional mixed gender 
samples of both offenders diagnosed with psychopathic personality disorder and 
community participants.  
Broadly, the results of this project add to the growing literature examining 
emotion processing deficits in psychopathic individuals. These results, in addition to the 
results of recent eye-tracking studies in psychopathic adult men (Boll & Gamer, 2016; 
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Gillespie et al., 2015), suggest that deficient emotion processing in psychopathic 
individuals may be due to attentional deficits rather than an inability to identify 
emotional facial expressions. Though further studies are needed before this conclusion 
can be drawn, it is worth noting that the most consistent results for deficient emotional 
processing in psychopathic individuals are reduced startle potentiation in response to 
aversive stimuli, as well as reductions in passive avoidance learning and responses to 
punishment (for a recent review of the research literature on psychopathic fearlessness, 
see Hoppenbrouwers, Bulten, & Brazil, 2016). Genotypic fearlessness may 
phenotypically express as deficits in threat detection and responsivity rather than 
inabilities to detect or recognize fear. The current body of research suffers from a lack of 
consensus about the components of the fearlessness construct. The inconsistent results in 
this area of research suggest that future projects should examine specific constructs 
under the umbrella of fearlessness (such as threat, punishment, or subjective experiences 
of fear) in order to better understand the relationship between psychopathy and 
fearlessness. 
 
 
 
 
 58 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Amir, N., Beard, C., Burns, M., & Bomyea, J. (2009). Attention modification program in 
individuals with generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
118(1), 28-33.  
Amir, N., Beard, C., Taylor, C. T., Klumpp, H., Elias, J., & Burns, M. (2009). Attention 
training in individuals with generalized social phobia: A randomized controlled 
trial. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 77(5), 961-973.  
Anderson, D. A. (1999). The aggregate burden of crime. Journal of Law and Economics, 
42(2), 611-642.  
Aniskiewicz, A. S. (1979). Autonomic components of vicarious conditioning and 
psychopathy. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 35, 60-67.  
Babiak, P., Neumann, C. S., & Hare, R. D. (2010). Corporate psychopathy: Talking the 
walk. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 28(2), 174-193.  
Baskin-Sommers, A. R., Curtin, J. J., & Newman, J. P. (2011). Specifying the attentional 
selection that moderates the fearlessness of psychopathic offenders. 
Psychological Science, 22, 226-234.  
Benning, S. D., Patrick, C. J., Blonigen, D. M., Hicks, B. M., & Iacono, W. G. (2005). 
Estimating facets of psychopathy from normal personality traits: A step toward 
community-epidemiological investigations. Assessment, 12, 3-18.  
Benning, S. D., Patrick, C. J., Hicks, B. M., Blonigen, D. M., & Krueger, R. F. (2003). 
Factor structure of the Psychpathic Personality Inventory: Validity and 
implications for clinical assessment. Psychological Assessment, 15, 340-350.  
 59 
 
 
Benning, S. D., Patrick, C. J., Salekin, R. T., & Leistico, A. R. (2005). Convergent and 
discriminant validity of psychopathy factors assessed via self-report: A 
comparison of three instruments. Assessment, 12, 270-289.  
Blair, K. S., Smith, B. W., Mitchell, D. G. V., Morton, J., Vythilingam, M., Pessoa, L., . 
. . Blair, R. J. R. (2007). Modulation of emotion by cognition and cognition by 
emotion. Neuroimage, 35, 430-440.  
Blair, R. J. R. (1995). A cognitive developmental approach to morality: Investigating the 
psychopath. Cognition, 57, 1-29.  
Blair, R. J. R. (1999). Responsiveness to distress cues in the child with psychopathic 
tendencies. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 135-145.  
Blair, R. J. R. (2003). Neurobiological basis of psychopathy. British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 182, 5-7.  
Blair, R. J. R. (2005). Applying a cognitive neuroscience perspective to the disorder of 
psychopathy. Development and Psychopathology, 17, 865-891.  
Blair, R. J. R., Colledge, E., & Mitchell, D. G. V. (2001). Somatic markers and response 
reversal: is there orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction in boys with psychopathic 
tendencies? Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 29, 499-511.  
Blair, R. J. R., Colledge, E., Murray, L. K., & Mitchell, D. G. V. (2001). A selective 
impairment in the processing of sad and fearful expressions in children with 
psychopathic tendencies. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 29(6), 491-
498.  
 60 
 
 
Blair, R. J. R., Jones, L., Clark, F., & Smith, M. (1997). The psychopathic individual: A 
lack of responsiveness to distress cues? Psychophysiology, 34, 192-198.  
Blair, R. J. R., & Mitchell, D. G. V. (2009). Psychopathy, attention and emotion. 
Psychological Medicine, 39, 543-555.  
Blair, R. J. R., Mitchell, D. G. V., & Blair, K. S. (2005). The Psychopath: Emotion and 
the Brain. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Blair, R. J. R., Mitchell, D. G. V., Leonard, A., Budhani, S., Peschardt, K. S., & 
Newman, C. (2004). Passive avoidance learning in indivudals with psychopathy: 
modulation by reward but not by punishment. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 37(6), 1179-1192.  
Blair, R. J. R., Mitchell, D. G. V., Richell, R. A., Kelly, S., Leonard, A., Newman, C., & 
Scott, S. K. (2002). Turning a deaf ear to fear: Impaired recognition of vocal 
affect in psychopathic individuals. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111, 682-
686.  
Blair, R. J. R., Morris, J. S., Frith, C. D., Perrett, D. I., & Dolan, R. J. (1999). 
Dissociable neural responses to facial expressions of sadness and anger. Brain, 
122, 883-893.  
Blonigen, D., Hicks, B., Patrick, C., Krueger, R., Iacono, W., & McGue, M. (2005). 
Psychopathic personality traits: Heritability and genetic overlap with 
internalizing and externalizing pathology. Psychological Medicine, 35, 637-648.  
Boll, S., & Gamer, M. (2016). Psychopathic traits affect the visual exploration of facial 
expressions. Biological Psychology, 117, 194-201.  
 61 
 
 
Book, A. S., Quinsey, V. L., & Langford, D. (2007). Psychopathy and the perception of 
affect and vulnerability. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 34, 531–544.  
Cale, E. M. & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2002). Sex differences in psychopathy and antisocial 
personality disorder: A review and integration. Clinical Psychology Review, 22, 
1179–1207.  
Christianson, S. A., Forth, A. E., Hare, R. D., Strachan, C., Lidberg, L., & Thorell, L. H. 
(1996). Remembering details of emotional events: a comparison between 
psychopathic and nonpsychopathic offenders. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 20, 437-443.  
Cleckley, H. M. (1941). The mask of sanity: An attempt to reinterpret the so-called 
psychopath. St. Louis: The C.V. Mosby Company. 
Cleckley, H. M. (1976). The mask of sanity (5 ed.). St. Louis, MO: Mosby. 
Craske, M. G., & Waters, A. M. (2005). Panic disorder, phobias, and generalized anxiety 
disorder. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 1, 197-225.  
Dadds, M. R., Masry, Y. E., Wimalaweera, M., & Guastella, A. J. (2008). Eye gaze 
explains fear recognition deficits in psychopathy. Journal of the American 
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 47(4), 455-463.  
Dadds, M. R., Perry, Y., Hawes, D. J., Merz, S., Riddell, A. C., Haines, D. J., . . . 
Abeygunawardane, A. I. (2006). Attention to the eyes and fear-recognition 
deficits in child psychopathy. British Journal of Psychiatry, 189, 280-281.  
Dawel, A., O'Kearney, R., McKone, E., Palermo, R. (2012). Not just fear and sadness: 
Meta-analytic evidence of pervasive emotion recognition deficits for facial and 
 62 
 
 
vocal expressions in psychopathy. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 36, 
2288–2304.  
Del Gaizo, A. L. & Falkenbach, D. M. (2008). Primary and secondary psychopathic 
traits and their relationship to perception and experience of emotion. Personality 
and Individual Differences 45, 206–212.  
Desimone, R., & Duncan, J. (1995). Neural mechanisms of selective visual attention. 
Annual Review of Neuroscience, 18, 193-222.  
Dolan, R. J. (1999). On the neurology of morals. Nature Neuroscience, 2(11), 927-929.  
Dolan, R. J., & Vuilleumier, P. (2003). Amygdala automaticity in emotional processing. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 985, 348-355.  
Duncan, J. (1998). Converging levels of analysis in the cognitive neuroscience of visual 
attention. Philosophical Transections of the Royal Society B, 353, 1307-1317.  
Dvorak-Bertsch, J. D., Curtin, J. J., Rubenstein, T. J., & Newman, J. P. (2009). 
Psychoathic traits moderate the interaction between cognitive and affective 
processing. Psychophysiology, 46, 913-921.  
Eisenbarth, H., Alpers, G. W., Segrè, D., Calogero, A., & Angrilli, A. (2008). 
Categorization and evaluation of emotional faces in psychopathic women. 
Psychiatry Research, 159, 189–195.  
Ermer, E., Cope, L. M., Nyalakanti, P. K., Calhoun, V. D., & Kiehl, K. A. (2012). 
Aberrant paralimbic gray matter in criminal psychopathy. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 121(3), 649-658.  
 63 
 
 
Erthal, F. S., de Oliveria, L., Mocaiber, I., Pereira, M. G., Machado-Pinheiro, W., 
Volchan, E., & Pessoa, L. (2005). Load-dependent modulation of affective 
picture processing. Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 5, 388-
395.  
Flor, H., Birbaumer, N., Hermann, C., Ziegler, S., & Patrick, C. J. (2002). Aversive 
Pavlovian conditioning in psychopaths: Peripheral and central correlates. 
Psychophysiology, 39, 505-518.  
Forouzan, E., & Cooke, D. J. (2005). Figuring out la femme fatale: Conceptual and 
assessment issues concerning psychopathy in females. Behavioral Sciences & the 
Law, 23, 765–778.  
Forth, A. E. (1992). Emotion and psychopathy: A three- component analysis. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 
Canada.  
Frick, P. J., & Hare, R. D. (2001). Antisocial process screening device. Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada: Multi-Health Systems. 
Frick, P. J., Lilienfeld, S. O., Ellis, M. L., Loney, B. R., & Silverthorn, P. (1999). The 
association between anxiety and psychopathy dimensions in children. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology, 27, 381-390.  
Frick, P. J., & Marsee, M. A. (2006). Psychopathy and developmental pathways to 
antisocial behavior in youth. In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of psychopathy (pp. 
353-374). New York: Guilford Press. 
 64 
 
 
Frick, P. J., & Morris, A. S. (2004). Temperament and developmental pathways to 
conduct problems. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 33, 54-
68.  
Frick, P. J., Ray, J. V., Thornton, L. C., & Kahn, R. E. (2013). Annual research review: 
A developmental psychopathology approach to understanding callous-
unemotional traits in children and adolescents with serious conduct problems. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry.  
Frick, P. J., Stickle, T. R., Dandreaux, D. M., Farrell, J. M., & Kimonis, E. R. (2005). 
Callous-unemotional traits in predicting the severity and stability of conduct 
problems and delinquency. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 33, 471-487.  
Fung, M., Raine, A., Loeber, R., Lynam, D. R., Steinhauer, S. R., Venables, P. H., & al., 
e. (2005). Reduced electrodermal activity in psychopathy-prone adolescents. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114(2), 187-196.  
Hoppenbrouwers, S. S., Bulten, B. H., & Brazil, I. A. (2016). Parsing fear: A 
reassessment of the evidence for fear deficits in psychopathy. Psychological 
Bulletin, 142(6), 573-600.  
Gillespie, S. M., Rotshtein, P., Wells, L. J., Beech, A. R., & Mitchell, I. J. (2015). 
Psychopathic traits are associated with reduced attention to the eyes of emotional 
faces among adult male non-offenders. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 9, 1-
11. 
Glass, S. J., & Newman, J. P. (2006). Recognition of facial affect in psychopathic 
offenders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(4), 815-820.  
 65 
 
 
Goodman, R. (1999). The extended version of the Strengths and Difficulties 
Questionnaire as a guide to child psychiatric caseness and consequent burden. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 40, 791-801.  
Guarraci, S. M., Fishalow, J. L., Strickland, K. J., Strickland, C. M., Drislane, L. E., & 
Patrick, C. J. (2013). Validation of a recruitment strategy using transdiagnostic 
dimensions. Paper presented at the 5th Biennial Meeting of the Society for the 
Scientific Study of Psychopathy, Washington, D.C.  
Guy, L. S., Edens, J. F., Anthony, C., & Douglas, K. S. (2005). Does psychopathy 
predict institutional misconduct among adults? A meta-analytic investigation. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 73(6), 1056-1064.  
Hakamata, Y., Lissek, S., Bar-Haim, Y., Britton, J. C., Fox, N. A., Leibenluft, E., & 
Pine, D. S. (2010). Attention bias modification treatment: A meta-analysis 
toward the establishment of novel treatment for anxiety. Biological Psychiatry, 
68, 982-990.  
Hansen, A. L., Johnsen, B. H., Hart, S., Waage, L., Thayer, J. F. (2008). Brief 
communication: Psychopathy and recognition of facial expressions of emotion. 
Journal of Personality Disorders, 22, 639–645.  
Hare, R. D. (1968). Psychopathy, autonomic functioning, and the orienting response. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 73(32), 1-24.  
Hare, R. D. (1980). A research scale for the assessment of psychopathy in criminal 
populations. Personality and Individual Differences, 1, 111-119.  
 66 
 
 
Hare, R. D. (1982). Psychopathy and physiological activity during anticipation of an 
aversive stimulus in a distraction paradigm. Psychophysiology, 19, 266-271.  
Hare, R. D. (1993). Without conscience: The disturbing world of the psychopaths among 
us. New York: Pocket Books. 
Hare, R. D. (1998). The Hare PCL-R: Some issues concerning its use and misuse. Legal 
and Criminological Psychopathy, 3(1), 99-119.  
Hare, R. D. (1999). Psychopathy as a risk factor for violence. Psychiatry Quarterly, 
70(3), 181-197.  
Hare, R. D. (2003). Manual for the Revised Psychopathy Checklist (2 ed.). Toronto, ON, 
Canada: Multi-Health Systems. 
Hare, R. D. (2006). Psychopathy: A Clinical and Forensic Overview. Psychiatric Clinics 
of North America, 29, 709-724.  
Hare, R. D., Harpur, T. J., Hakstian, A. R., Forth, A. E., Hart, S. D., & Newman, J. P. 
(1990). The Revised Psychopathy Checklist: Reliability and factor structure. 
Psychological Assessment, 2, 338-341.  
Hare, R. D., & Neumann, C. S. (2006). The PCL-R assessment of psychopathy: 
Development, structural properties, and new directions. In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), 
Handbook of psychopathy (pp. 58-88). New York: Guilford Press. 
Hare, R. D., & Quinn, M. J. (1971). Psychopathy and autonomic conditioning. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 77(3), 223-235.  
Harpur, T. J., Hakstian, A. R., & Hare, R. D. (1988). Factor structure of the Psychopathy 
Checklist. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56, 741-747.  
 67 
 
 
Harpur, T. J., Hare, R. D., & Hakstian, A. R. (1989). Two-factor conceptualization of 
psychopathy: Construct validity and assessment implications. Psychological 
Assessment, 1(1), 6-17.  
Hastings, M. E., Tangney, J. P., & Stuewig, J. (2008). Psychopathy and identification of 
facial expressions of emotion. Personality and Individual Differences, 44, 1474-
1483.  
Herpertz, S. C., & Sass, H. (2000). Emotional deficiency and psychopathy. Behavioral 
Sciences & the Law, 18, 567-580.  
Hiatt, K. D., Schmitt, W. A., & Newman, J. P. (2004). Stroop tasks reveal abnormal 
selective attention among psychopathic offenders. Neuropsychology, 18, 50-59.  
Hicks, B. M., Markon, K. E., Patrick, C. J., Krueger, R. F., & Newman, J. P. (2004). 
Identifying psychopathy subtypes on the basis of personality structure. 
Psychological Assessment, 16, 276-288.  
House, T. H., & Lloyd Milligan, W. (1976). Autonomic responses to modeled distress in 
prison psychopaths. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34(4), 556-
560.  
Iria, C., & Barbosa, F. (2009). Perception of facial expressions of fear: Comparative 
research with criminal and non-criminal psychopaths. Journal of Forensic 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 20(1), 66-73.  
Karpman, B. (1941). On the need of separating psychopathy into two distinct clinical 
types: The symptomatic and the idiopathic. Journal of Criminal 
Psychopathology, 3, 112-137.  
 68 
 
 
Kiehl, K. A. (2006). A cognitive neuroscience perspective on psychopathy: evidence for 
a paralimbic system dysfunction. Psychiatry Research, 142, 107-128.  
Kiehl, K. A., & Hoffman, M. B. (2011). The criminal psychopath: History, 
neuroscience, and economics. Jurimetrics Journal, 51, 355-397.  
Kiehl, K. A., Smith, A. M., Hare, R. D., Mendrek, A., Forster, B. B., Brink, J., & Liddle, 
P. F. (2001). Limbic abnormalities in affective processing by criminal 
psychopaths as revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging. Biological 
Psychiatry, 50, 677-684.  
Killgore, W., & Yurgelun-Todd, D. (2001). Sex differences in amygdala activation 
during the perception of facial affect. Neuroreport, 12, 2543-2547. 
Kimonis, E. R., Frick, P. J., Fazekas, H., & Loney, B. R. (2006). Psychopathy, 
aggression, and the processing of emotional stimuli in non-referred girls and 
boys. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 2(24), 21–37.  
Kimonis, E. R., Frick, P. J., Muñoz, L. C., & Aucoin, K. J. (2008). Callous– unemotional 
traits and the emotional processing of distress cues in detained boys: Testing the 
moderating role of aggression, exposure to community violence, and histories of 
abuse. Development and Psychopathology, 20, 569–589.  
Kimonis, E. R., Frick, P. J., Cauffman, E., Goldweber, A., & Skeem, J. (2012). Primary 
and secondary variants of juvenile psychopathy differ in emotional processing. 
Development and Psychopathology, 24, 1091-1103.  
 69 
 
 
Kochanska, G. (1995). Children's temperament, mothers' discipline, and security of 
attachment: Multiple pathways to emerging internalization. Child Development, 
66, 597-615.  
Kochanska, G. K. (1997). Multiple pathways to conscience for children with different 
temperaments: From toddlerhood to age 5. Developmental Psychology, 33, 228-
240.  
Kosson, D. (1998). Divided visual attention in psychopathic and nonpsychopathic 
offenders. Personality and Individual Differences, 24, 373-391.  
Krueger, R. F., Markon, K. E., Patrick, C. J., Benning, S. D., & Kramer, M. (2007). 
Linking antisocial behavior, substance use, and personality: An integrative 
quantitative model of the adult externalizing spectrum. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 116, 645-666.  
LaPierre, D. C., Braun, M. J., & Hodgins, S. (1995). Ventral frontal deficits in 
psychopathy: Neuropsychological test findings. Neuropsychologia, 33, 139-151.  
Larson, C. L., Baskin-Sommers, A. R., Stout, D. M., Balderston, N. L., Curtin, J. J., 
Schultz, D. H., . . . Newman, J. P. (2013). The interplay of attention and emotion: 
Top-down attention modulates amygdala activation in psychopathy. Cognitive, 
Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience, 13, 757-770.  
LeDoux, J. (1998). The Emotional Brain. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Levenston, G. K., Patrick, C. J., Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (2000). The psychopath 
as observer: Emotion and attention in picture processing. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 109, 373-386.  
 70 
 
 
Lilienfeld, S. O., & Andrews, B. P. (1996). Development and preliminary validation of a 
self-report measure of psychopathic personality traits in nomcriminal 
populations. Journal of Personality Assessment, 66(3), 488-524.  
Lilienfeld, S. O., Patrick, C. J., Benning, S. D., Berg, J., Sellbom, M., & Edens, J. F. 
(2012). The role of fearless dominance in psychopathy: Confusions, 
controversies, and clarifications. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and 
Treatment, 3, 327-340.  
Lilienfeld, S. O., & Widows, M. R. (2005). Psychopathy Personality Inventory-Revised: 
Professional manual. Lutz, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. 
Lorber, M. F. (2004). Psychophysiology of aggression, psychopathy, and conduct 
problems: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 130(4), 531-552.  
Lorenz, A. R., & Newman, J. P. (2002). Deficient response modulation and emotion 
processing in low-anxious Caucasian psychopathic offenders: Results from a 
lexical decision task. Emotion, 2, 91-104.  
Luu, P., Tucker, D. M., & Derryberry, D. (1998). Anxiety and the motivational basis of 
working memory. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 22(6), 577-594.  
Lykken, D. T. (1957). A study of anxiety in the sociopathic personality. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 55, 6-10.  
Lykken, D. T. (1995). The antisocial personalities. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Lynam, D. R. (1997). Pursuing the psychopath: Capturing the fledgling psychopath in a 
nomological net. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106(3), 425-438.  
 71 
 
 
MacLeod, C., Mathews, A., & Tata, A. (1986). Attentional bias and emotional disorders. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95, 15–20.  
Marcus, D. K., Fulton, J. J., & Edens, J. F. (2013). The two-factor model of 
psychopathic personality: Evidence from the Psychopathic Personality Inventory. 
Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 4, 67-76.  
Marsh, A. A., & Blair, R. J. R. (2008). Deficits in facial affect recognition among 
antisocial populations: A meta-analysis. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral 
Reviews, 32, 454-465.  
McCord, W., & McCord, J. (1964). The psychopath: An essay on the criminal mind. 
Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. 
Miller, J. D., & Lynam, D. R. (2012). An examination of the Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory's Nomological Network: A Meta-Analytic Review. Personality 
Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 3(3), 305-326.  
Miller, M. A., & Fillmore, M. T. (2010). The effect of image complexity on attentional 
bias towards alcohol-related images in adult drinkers. Addiction, 105, 883-890.  
Mitchell, D. G. V., Colledge, E., Leonard, A., & Blair, R. J. R. (2002). Risky decisions 
and response reversal: Is there evidence of orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction in 
psychopathic individuals? Neuropsychologia, 40, 2013-2022.  
Mitchell, D. G. V., Nakic, M., Fridberg, D., Kamel, N., Pine, D. S., & Blair, R. J. R. 
(2007). The impact of processing load on emotion. Neuroimage, 34, 1299-1309.  
 72 
 
 
Mitchell, D. G. V., Richell, R. A., Leonard, A., & Blair, R. J. R. (2006). Emotion at the 
expense of cognition: Psychopathic individuals outperform controls on an 
operant response task. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(3), 559-566.  
Motzkin, J. C., Newman, J. P., Kiehl, K. A., & Koenigs, M. (2011). Reduced prefrontal 
connectivity in psychopathy. The Journal of Neuroscience, 31(48), 17348-17357.  
Mullins-Nelson, J. L., Salekin, R. T., & Leistico, A. M. R. (2006). Psychopathy, 
empathy, and perspective-taking ability in a community sample: Implications for 
the successful psychopathy concept. International Journal of Forensic Mental 
Health, 5(2), 133-149.  
Newman, J. P. (1998). Psychopathic behaviour: An information processing perspective. 
In D. J. Cooke, A. Forth & R. D. Hare (Eds.), Psychopathy: Theory, research, 
and implications for society. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic. 
Newman, J. P., & Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (2011). Early selective attention abnormalities 
in psychopathy: Implications for self-regulation. In M. I. Posner (Ed.), Cognitive 
neuroscience of attention (2 ed., pp. 421-440). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Newman, J. P., Curtin, J. J., Bertsch, J. D., & Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (2010). Attention 
moderates the fearlessness of psychopathic offenders. Biological Psychiatry, 67, 
66-70.  
Newman, J. P., & Kosson, D. (1986). Passive avoidance learning in psychopathic and 
nonpsychopathic offenders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95, 252-256.  
Newman, J. P., Patterson, C. M., & Kosson, D. S. (1987). Reponse perseveration in 
psychopaths. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 96, 145-148.  
 73 
 
 
Newman, J. P., & Schmitt, W. A. (1998). Passive avoidance in psychopathic offenders: 
A replication and extension. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, 527-532.  
Newman, J. P., Schmitt, W. A., & Voss, W. D. (1997). The impact of motivationally 
neutral cues on psychopathic individuals: Assessing the generality of the 
response modulation hypothesis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106, 563-575.  
Newman, J. P., Widom, C. S., & Nathan, S. (1985). Passive avoidance in syndromes of 
disinhibition: Psychopathy and extraversion. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 48(5), 1316-1327.  
Ogloff, J. R., & Wong, S. (1990). Electrodermal and cardiovascular evidence of a coping 
response in psychopaths. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 17, 231-245.  
Pardini, D. A., Lochman, J. E., & Frick, P. J. (2003). Callous/unemotional traits and 
social cognitive processes in adjudicated youth. Journal of the American 
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 42, 364-371.  
Patrick, C. J. (1994). Emotion and psychopathy: Startling new insights. 
Psychophysiology, 31, 319-330.  
Patrick, C. J., Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1993). Emotion in the criminal psychopath: 
Startle reflex modulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 82-92.  
Patrick, C. J., Cuthbert, B. N., & Lang, P. J. (1994). Emotion in the criminal psychopath: 
Fear image processing. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103(3), 523-534.  
Patrick, C. J., Drislane, L. E., & Strickland, C. (2012). Conceptualizing psychopathy in 
triarchic terms: Implications for treatment. International Journal of Forensic 
Mental Health, 11(4), 253-266.  
 74 
 
 
Patrick, C. J., Edens, J. F., Poythress, N., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2006). Construct validity 
of the PPI two-factor model with offenders. Psychological Assessment, 18, 204-
208.  
Patrick, C. J., Fowles, D. C., & Krueger, R. F. (2009). Triarchic concepualization of 
psychopathy: Developmental origins of disinhibition, boldness, and meanness. 
Development and Psychopathology, 21(3), 913-938.  
Patrick, C. J., Hicks, B. M., Krueger, R. F., & Lang, A. R. (2005). Relations between 
psychopathy facets and externalizing in a criminal offender sample. Journal of 
Personality Disorders, 19, 339-356.  
Patrick, C. J., Hicks, B. M., Nichol, P. E., & Krueger, R. F. (2007). A bifactor approach 
to modeling the structure of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised. Journal of 
Personality Disorders, 21, 118-141.  
Patterson, C. M., & Newman, J. P. (1993). Reflectivity and learning from aversive 
events: Toward a psychological mechanism for the syndromes of disinhibition. 
Psychological Review, 100, 716-736.  
Pessoa, L. (2005). To what extent are emotional visual stimuli processed without 
attention and awareness? Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 15, 188-196.  
Pessoa, L., McKenna, M., Gutierrez, E., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2002). Neural processing 
of emotional faces requires attention. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 99, 11458-11463.  
Pessoa, L., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2004). Neuroimaging studies of attention and the 
processing of emotion-laden stimuli. Progress in Brain Research, 144, 171-182.  
 75 
 
 
Phillips, M. L., Young, A. W., Senior, C., Brammer, M., Andrew, C., Calder, A. J., 
Bullmore, E. T., Perrett, D. I., Rowland, D., Williams, S. C., Gray, J. A., & 
David, A. S. (1997, October 2). A specific neural substrate for perceiving facial 
expressions of disgust. Nature, 389, 495– 498.  
Ragatz, L. L., & Fremouw, W. (2012). The psychological profile of white-collar 
offenders: Demographics, ciminal thinking, psychopathic traits, and 
psychopathology. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 39(7), 978-997.  
Raine, A. (1993). Psychophysiology. In A. Raine (Ed.), The psychopathology of crime. 
(pp. 157-190). San Antonio: Academic. 
Reidy, D. E., Kearns, M. C., & DeGue, S. (2013). Reducing psychopathic violence: A 
review of the treatment literature. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 18(5), 527-
538.  
Reidy, D. E., Shelley-Tremblay, J. F., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2011). Psychopathy, reactive 
aggression, and precarious proclamations: A review of behavioral, cognitive, and 
biological research. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 16(6), 512-524.  
Schmauk, F. J. (1970). Punishment, arousal, and avoidance learning in sociopaths. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 76(3), 325-335.  
Sellbom, M., & Phillips, T. R. (2012). An examination of the triarchic conceputalization 
of psychopathy in incarcerated and nonincarcerated samples. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 122, 208-214.  
Shaw, D. S., Gilliom, M., Ingoldsby, E. M., & Nagia, D. (2003). Trajectories leading to 
school-age conduct problems. Developmental Psychology, 39, 189-200.  
 76 
 
 
Siegel, R. A. (1978). Probability of punishment and suppression of behavior in 
psychopathic and nonpsychopathic offenders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
87(5), 514-522.  
Skeem, J. L., & Cooke, D. J. (2010a). Is criminal behavior a central component of 
psychopathy? Conceptual directions for resolving the debate. Psychological 
Assessment, 22(2), 433-445.  
Skeem, J. L., & Cooke, D. J. (2010b). One measure does not a construct make: 
Directions toward reinvigorating psychopathy research - Reply to Hare and 
Neumann (2010). Psychological Assessment, 22(2), 455-459.  
Smith, S. F., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2013). Psychopathy in the workplace: The knowns and 
unknowns. Aggression & Violent Behavior, 18(2), 204-218.  
Smith, S. T., Edens, J. F., & McDermott, B. E. (2013). Fearless Dominance and Self-
Centered Impulsivity interact to predict predatory aggression among forensic 
inpatients. International Journal of Forensic Mental Health, 12, 33-41.  
Stein, M. B., Goldin, P. R., Sareen, J., Zorrilla, L. T. E., & Brown, G. G. (2002). 
Increased amygdala activation to angry and contemptuous faces in generalized 
social phobia. Archives of General Psychiatry, 59, 1027-1034.  
Stevens, D., Charman, T., & Blair, R. J. R. (2001). Recognition of emotion in facial 
expressions and vocal tones in children with psychopathic tendencies. Journal of 
Genetic Psychology, 162, 201-211.  
 77 
 
 
Tiihonen, J., Hodgins, S., Vaurio, O., Laakso, M., Repo, E., Soininen, H., . . . 
Savolainen, L. (2000). Amygdaloid volume loss in psychopathy. Society For 
Neuroscience Abstracts, 26(1-2).  
Tottenham, N., Tanaka, J. W., Leon, A. C., McCarry, T., Nurse, M., Hare, T. A., . . . 
Nelson, C. (2009). The NimStim set of facial expressions: Judgments from 
untrained research participants. Psychiatry Research, 168(3), 242-249.  
Veit, R., Flor, H., Erb, M., Hermann, C., Lotze, M., Grodd, W., & Birbaumer, N. (2002). 
Brain circuits involved in emotional learning in antisocial behavior and social 
phobia in humans. Neuroscience Letters, 238, 233-236.  
Venables, N. C., & Patrick, C. J. (2012). Validity of the Externalizing Spectrum 
Inventory in a criminal offender sample: Relations with disinhibitory 
psychopathology, personality, and psychopathic features. Psychological 
Assessment, 24, 88-100.  
Verona, E., & Vitale, J. (2006). Psychopathy in women: Assessment, manifestation, and 
etiology. In Patrick C. J. (Ed.), Handbook of psychopathy (pp. 415–436). New 
York: Guilford Press.  
Vuilleumier, P., Armony, J. L., Driver, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2001). Effects of attention and 
emotion on face processing in the human brain: An event-related fMRI study. 
Neuron, 30, 829-841.  
Wilson, K., Juodis, M., & Porter, S. (2011). Fear and loathing in psychopaths: A meta-
analytic investigation of the facial affect recognition deficit. Criminal Justice & 
Behavior, 38(7), 659-668.  
 78 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Table 1 
Mean (SD) Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM) Scores 
 Boldness Meanness Disinhibition TriPM Total 
Total Sample  
(N = 110) 
33.02 (7.83) 12.05 (10.11) 13.92 (8.03) 58.99 (20.64) 
Emotion Identification 
Task (N = 96) 
33.21 (7.91) 12.29 (10.33) 13.77 (7.69) 59.27 (20.87) 
Dot Probe Task  
(N = 89) 
33.42 (7.80) 12.82 (10.52) 14.25 (7.76) 60.48 (21.01) 
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Table 2 
Correlations (r) Between TriPM Scores and Correct Emotion Identification (N = 96) 
 Emotion 
 Calm Fear Sad Happy Anger Disgust 
M identification 
rate (SD) 
.85 (.16) .50 (.21) .64 (.20) .94 (.11) .82 (.13) .76 (.13) 
Boldness -.06 .02 -.01 -.09 -.09 -.01 
Meanness .08 -.07 -.05 -.09 .14 -.21* 
Disinhibition -.01 -.01 .05 -.14 .10 -.21* 
Total TriPM .01 -.03 -.01 -.13 .14 -.19 
* p < .05 
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Table 3 
Mean (SD) Correct Emotion Identification Scores by Group 
 High psychopathy (N = 49) Low psychopathy (N = 47) 
Calm faces .86 (.17) .83 (.16) 
Fear faces .51 (.19) .50 (.23) 
Anger faces .82 (.13) .81 (.13) 
Sad faces .62 (.20) .66 (.20) 
Disgust faces .74 (.12) .78 (.13) 
Happy faces .93 (.11) .96 (.20) 
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Table 4 
Correct Emotion Identification ANOVA Results 
Source SS df MS F p η2 
Calm Faces 
Group 0.03 1 0.03 1.12 .292 .01 
Error 2.55 94 0.03    
Total 2.58 95     
Fear Faces 
Group 0.00 1 0.00 0.06 .810 .00 
Error 4.19 94 0.05    
Total 4.19 95     
Anger Faces 
Group 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 .958 .00 
Error 1.65 94 0.02    
Total 1.65 95     
Sad Faces 
Group 0.05 1 0.05 1.14 .288 .01 
Error 3.70 94 0.04    
Total 3.75 95     
Disgust Faces 
Group 0.03 1 0.03 2.03 .158 .02 
Error 1.60 94 0.02    
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Table 4 Continued 
Source SS df MS F p η2 
Total 1.63 95     
Happy Faces 
Group 0.02 1 0.02 1.78 .186 .02 
Error 1.05 94 0.01    
Total 1.07 95     
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Table 5 
Adjusted Mean (SE) Emotion Identification Response Times by Group 
 High psychopathy (N = 49) Low psychopathy (N = 47) 
Calm faces 1513.99 (88.08) 1487.45 (90.17) 
Fear faces 1569.85 (93.67) 1592.02 (95.89) 
Sad faces 1514.74 (108.02) 1539.89 (110.58) 
Disgust faces 1246.91 (89.02) 1254.59 (91.13) 
Happy faces 1066.81 (70.87) 1117.95 (72.55) 
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Table 6 
Emotion Identification Response Time ANCOVA Results 
Source SS df MS F p η2 
Calm faces 
Group 13146.36 1 13146.36 3.98 .049 .00 
Gender 1327282.13 1 1327282.13 0.04 .843 .04 
Error 31013498.10 93 333478.47    
Total 32897297.20 95     
Fear faces 
Group 9170.95 1 9170.95 0.02 .876 .00 
Gender 1820152.59 1 1820152.59 4.83 .031 .05 
Error 35076198.30 93 377163.42    
Total 37271810.60 95     
Sad faces 
Group 11799.20 1 11799.20 0.02 .878 .00 
Gender 4276686.25 1 4276686.25 8.53 .004 .08 
Error 46639678.70 93 501501.92    
Total 51881736.60 95     
Disgust faces 
Group 1101.33 1 1101.33 0.00 .955 .00 
Gender 1717836.57 1 1717836.57 5.04 .027 .05 
Error 31676214.70 93 340604.46    
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Table 6 Continued 
Source SS df MS F p η2 
Total 33833808.90 95     
Happy faces 
Group 48782.32 1 48782.32 0.23 .636 .00 
Gender 1098984.84 1 109894.84 5.09 .026 .05 
Error 20075440.70 93 215864.95    
Total 21270559.20 95     
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Table 7 
Summary of Total Fixations by Emotion and Area of Interest 
Emotion M (sd) Fixations on Eyes M (sd) Fixations on Mouth 
Calm 8.74 (8.56) 15.07 (11.83) 
Fear 9.96 (10.03) 15.28 (11.34) 
Sad 12.15 (14.64) 14.60 (11.49) 
Anger 9.38 (8.92) 17.91 (12.94) 
Happy 10.68 (12.33) 15.19 (12.38) 
Disgust 10.53 (9.86) 15.36 (12.11) 
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Table 8 
Summary of Regression Analyses for Fixations Predicting Emotion Identification Errors 
Emotion F
a
 p R
2
 
Calm 1.38 .262 .06 
Fear 6.14 .004 .21 
Sad .58 .563 .03 
Anger 1.16 .322 .05 
Happy 1.46 .243 .06 
Disgust .30 .745 .01 
a
 df = 2, 46 
 88 
 
 
Table 9 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for TriPM Scores and Fixations 
Predicting Emotion Identification Errors 
Emotion F (df) p R
2
 ΔR2 
Calm     
Step 1
a
 1.54 .22 .09 .09 
Step 2
b
 1.20 .33 .17 .08 
Step 3
c
 1.15 .35 .21 .04 
Fear     
Step 1 .49  .69 .03 .03 
Step 2 .79 .60 .12 .09 
Step 3 1.93 .08 .31 .19** 
Sad     
Step 1 1.08  .37 .07 .07 
Step 2 .75 .63 .11 .05 
Step 3 .76 .66 .15 .04 
Anger     
Step 1 1.37 .27 .08 .08 
Step 2 1.89 .10 .24 .16 
Step 3 1.49 .19 .26 .01 
Happy     
Step 1 .55 .65 .04 .04 
Step 2 1.03 .43 .15 .11 
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Table 9 Continued 
Emotion F (df) p R
2
 ΔR2 
Step 3 1.23 .31 .22 .07 
Disgust     
Step 1 2.41 .08 .14 .14 
Step 2 2.86 .02 .33 .19* 
Step 3 2.40 .03 .36 .03 
a
 Predictors: boldness, meanness, disinhibition; df = 3,45 
b
 Predictors: boldness*meanness, boldness*disinhibition, meanness*disinhibition, 
boldness*meanness*disinhibition; df = 7,41 
c
 Predictors: Sum of fixations on eye area, sum of fixations on mouth area; df = 9,39 
* p ≤ .05 
** p < .001 
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Table 10 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for TriPM Scores and Fixations Predicting 
Disgust Identification Errors 
Variable β t sr2 R R2 ΔR2 
Step 1    .37 .14 .14 
Boldness -.06 -.42 .00    
Meanness .23 1.05 .02    
Disinhibition .18 .85 .01    
Step 2    .57 .33 .19* 
Boldness -.02 -.08 .00    
Meanness .45 1.83 .05    
Disinhibition .17 .69 .01    
Boldness*Meanness -.12 -.42 .00    
Boldness*Disinhibition .12 .52 .00    
Meanness*Disinhibition .48 2.76** .13    
Boldness*Meanness* 
Disinhibition 
-.05 -.19 .00    
Step 3    .60 .36 .03 
Boldness -.06 -.28 .00    
Meanness .50 2.00* .07    
Disinhibition .13 .64 .01    
Boldness*Meanness -.10 -.36 .00    
Boldness*Disinhibition .12 .54 .00    
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Table 10 Continued 
Variable β t sr2 R R2 ΔR2 
Meanness*Disinhibition .51 2.90** .14    
Boldness*Meanness* 
Disinhibition 
.00 -.01 .00    
Sum of fixations on eyes -.03 -.22 .00    
Sum of fixations on mouth -.17 -1.31 .03    
* p ≤ .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 11 
Summary of Dot Probe Task Results 
M (sd) Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 
Total    
Score .97 (.14) .98 (.11) .98 (.11) 
Response Time 384.83 (55.39) 380.47 (54.75) 390.93 (54.82) 
Probe at Fear Face    
Score .99 (.03) .98 (.11) .98 (.11) 
Response Time 385.27 (51.74) 379.97 (55.11) 389.74 (55.81) 
Probe at Calm Face    
Score .99 (.03) .99 (.11) .98 (.11) 
Response Time 385.36 (58.84) 388.56 (62.68) 392.24 (57.08) 
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Table 12 
Correlations (r) Between TriPM Scores and Dot Probe Scores (N = 90) 
 Boldness Meanness Disinhibition TriPM Total 
Total     
Block 1 -.03 -.01 .01 -.01 
Block 2 -.14 .01 .10 -.01 
Block 3 -.15 .02 .11 -.01 
Probe at Fear Face     
Block 1 -.06  -.15 -.07 -.13 
Block 2 -.13 .01 .11 .00 
Block 3 -.15 .06 .15 .02 
Probe at Calm Face     
Block 1 -.02 -.24* -.14 -.18 
Block 2 -.14 .02 .10 -.01 
Block 3 -.14 -.01 .07 -.03 
* p < .05 
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Table 13 
Correlations (r) Between TriPM Scores and Dot Probe Response Times (N = 90) 
 Boldness Meanness Disinhibition TriPM Total 
Total     
Block 1 .11 .20 .07 .17 
Block 2 .03 .16 .14 .14 
Block 3 .02 .16 .09 .12 
Probe at Fear Face     
Block 1 .09 .24* .11 .20 
Block 2 .02 .14 .12 .12 
Block 3 .05 .14 .06 .11 
Probe at Calm Face     
Block 1 .11 .16 .04 .14 
Block 2 .07 .28* .18 .23* 
Block 3 -.01 .17 .11 .13 
* p < .05 
 95 
 
 
Table 14 
Correlations (r) Between Facilitation and TriPM Scores (N = 87) 
 Block 1 Block 3 
Boldness -.02 -.10 
Meanness -.20 .09 
Disinhibition -.14 .10 
TriPM Total -.16 .05 
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Table 15 
Mean Facilitation by Psychopathy Group and Gender Across Dot Probe Task Blocks 
  Means (SD) 
Group N Block 1 Block 3 
LP Women 36 4.91 (19.27) 1.87 (24.82) 
HP Women 22 3.85 (21.30) -2.25 (25.29) 
LP Men 3 3.03 (14.01) -8.37 (21.00) 
HP Men 26 -4.20 (13.01) 8.11 (26.64) 
Note: LP = “low psychopathy” group, HP = “high psychopathy” group 
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Table 16 
Summary of Two-Way Repeated Measures ANOVA Results – Group by Gender 
Facilitation Performance Across Dot Probe Task Blocks 
Source SS df MS F p 
Between Subjects      
Group 18.65 1 18.65 0.03 .865 
Gender 107.96 1 107.96 0.17 .682 
Error (between) 52834.73 83    
Within Subjects      
Block 76.27 1 76.27 0.23 .635 
Block * Group 478.56 1 478.56 1.42 .236 
Block * Gender 113.43 1 113.43 0.34 .563 
Block * Group * 
Gender 
805.38 1 805.38 2.39 .126 
Error (within) 27934.34 83 336.56   
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Table 17 
Summary of Eye Tracking Results for Dot Probe Task 
 M (sd) 
 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 
Total fixations 155.36 (64.70) 155.45 (63.15) 146.49 (63.17) 
Total duration 45.71 (15.05) 46.67 (15.60) 43.98 (17.13) 
Fear fixations 31.09 (19.62) 26.36 (18.52) 27.62 (17.75) 
Eye fixations 18.51 (15.94) 16.85 (15.32) 15.15 (14.45) 
Mouth fixations 2.96 (3.90) 3.89 (4.68) 2.89 (3.89) 
Calm fixations 16.06 (12.19) 15.38 (12.22) 14.81 (11.04) 
Eye fixations 16.72 (13.96) 17.51 (13.87) 14.98 (13.89) 
Mouth fixations 3.81 (4.36) 6.09 (5.94) 4.15 (4.28) 
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Table 18 
Correlations (r) Between Eye Tracking Results and TriPM Scores in Dot Probe Task 
 Boldness Meanness Disinhibition TriPM Total 
Block 1     
Fear fixations .18 -.04 -.01 .04 
Eye fixations .16 .16 .16 .20 
Mouth fixations .08 -.11 -.19 -.10 
Calm fixations .14 -.15 -.11 -.07 
Eye fixations .24 .24 .16 .27 
Mouth fixations .00 .05 .01 .03 
Block 2     
Fear fixations .14 -.05 -.07 .00 
Eye fixations .13 .25 .21 .25 
Mouth fixations .19 .08 .03 .11 
Calm fixations .09 -.34* -.34* -.27 
Eye fixations .21 .17 .12 .21 
Mouth fixations .13 .23 .19 .23 
Block 3     
Fear fixations .17 -.05 -.08 .00 
Eye fixations .15 .23 .18 .23 
Mouth fixations .05 .03 -.04 .02 
Calm fixations .07 -.16 -.21 -.13 
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Table 18 Continued 
 Boldness Meanness Disinhibition TriPM Total 
Eye fixations .14 .38** .33* .36* 
Mouth fixations .07 .14 .01 .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 19 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Gender, TriPM Scores, and Fixations 
Predicting Facilitation 
Block 1 F df p R
2
 ΔR2 
Step 1
a
 1.43 1, 42 .238 .03 .03 
Step 2
b
 1.26  4, 39 .301 .16 .08 
Step 3
c
 .75  8, 35 .646 .15 .03 
Step 4
d
 .68  14,29 .778 .25 .10 
Block 3 F df p R
2
 ΔR2 
Step 1 1.30  1, 42 .260 .03 .03 
Step 2 .91  4, 39 .469 .09 .06 
Step 3 .43  8, 35 .896 .09 .00 
Step 4 .53  14, 29 .894 .20 .12 
a 
Predictor: gender 
b
 Predictors: boldness, meanness, disinhibition 
c
 Predictors: boldness*meanness, boldness*disinhibition, meanness*disinhibition, 
boldness*meanness*disinhibition 
d
 Predictors: total fear fixations, fixations on fear face eyes, fixations on fear face 
mouths, total calm fixations, fixations on calm face eyes, fixations on calm face 
mouths 
 
